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SUPER WICKED PROBLEMS AND CLIMATE
CHANGE: RESTRAINING THE PRESENT
TO LIBERATE THE FUTURE
Richard J. Lazarus†
Climate change may soon have its “lawmaking moment” in the United
States.  The inherent problem with such lawmaking moments, however, is
just that: they are moments.  What Congress and the President do with much
fanfare can quickly and quietly slip away in the ensuing years.  This is
famously so for environmental law.  Subsequent legislative amendments, lim-
ited budgets, appropriations riders, interpretive agency rulings, massive de-
lays in rulemaking, and simple nonenforcement are more than capable of
converting a seemingly uncompromising legal mandate into nothing more
than a symbolic aspirational statement.  Climate change legislation is espe-
cially vulnerable to being unraveled over time for a variety of reasons, but
especially because of the extent to which it imposes costs on the short term for
the realization of benefits many decades and sometimes centuries later.  To be
successful over the long term, climate change legislation will need to include
institutional design features that insulate programmatic implementation to a
† Professor of Law, Georgetown University.  I would like to thank Jennifer Locke
Davitt of the Georgetown University Law Center Library, Damien Leonard and Edward
Sunwoo, both of the Georgetown University Law Center Class of 2010; Erika Kranz and
Julia Stein, both of the Georgetown University Law Center Class of 2009; Elizabeth Black
and Susannah Foster, both of the Georgetown University Law Center Class of 2008; and
Matthew Littleton, Harvard Law School Class of 2010, for their outstanding research assis-
tance in the preparation of this article.  I am grateful for excellent comments on drafts
from Professors Hope Babcock, Rachel Barkow, David Barron, Erik Bluemal, Peter Byrne,
John Dernbach, John Echeverria, Jody Freeman, Michael Gerrard, Sam Issacharoff, Howell
Jackson, Vicki Jackson, Douglas Kysar, Amanda Leiter, Daryl Levinson, John Mikhail, Todd
Rakoff, David Schoenbrod, Roy Schotland, Phil Schrag, Chris Schroeder, Richard Stewart,
Dan Tarlock, David Uhlmann, Jonathan Weiner, Edith Brown Weiss, and Katrina Wyman;
to participants at faculty workshops at the Georgetown University Law Center and at
Harvard Law School; and to the organizers of  the conference on “Breaking the Logjam:
Environmental Reform for the New Congress and Administration,” held at New York Uni-
versity Law School on March 28–29, 2008, at which a very early draft was first discussed.  I
would also like to express my gratitude to Kelly Levin, Steven Bernstein, Benjamin
Cashore, and Graeme Auld, whose paper, Playing It Forward: Path Dependency, Progressive
Incrementalism, and the “Super Wicked” Problem of Global Climate Change 8–10 (July 7, 2007)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available at http://environment.yale.edu/
uploads/publications/2007levinbernsteincashoreauldWicked-Problems.pdf, presented at
the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention in Chicago on March 2,
2007, first introduced me to the notion of characterizing climate change as a “super wicked
problem.” See infra notes 10–15 and accompanying text.  Although I have long reflected R
on the features of climate change that render it a heightened challenge for lawmaking, the
analytical framework that they first developed provides an especially useful way of organiz-
ing and discussing those varied features.
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significant extent from powerful political and economic interests propelled by
short-term concerns.  Such design features should include a variety of asym-
metric precommitment strategies, which deliberately make it hard (never im-
possible) to change the law in response to some kinds of concerns while
simultaneously providing avenues for change in response to other longer term
concerns that are in harmony with the law’s central purpose—to achieve and
maintain greenhouse gas emissions reductions over time.  The traditional
objection to lawmaking precommitment strategies—that the present should
not be allowed to bind future lawmakers—also has little force in the climate-
change context, where the purpose of such strategies is not to protect the pre-
sent at the expense of the future, but the precise opposite: to protect the future
at the expense of the present.
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INTRODUCTION
During the next four years, the new President, Barack Obama,
and the new Congress are expected to join together in the first serious
effort in the United States to enact sweeping national legislation to
address global climate change.  If they are successful, federal climate
legislation will be the first major environmental protection law in al-
most two decades, dating back to the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990.1  Indeed, given the enormity of the undertaking necessary to
address climate change, the passage of federal climate change legisla-
tion will rival in historic significance one of the nation’s greatest law-
making moments—the passage in the 1970s of a series of
extraordinarily demanding and sweeping pollution control and natu-
ral resource conservation laws.2  To reduce the nation’s greenhouse
gas emissions from 1990 levels by as much as 60 percent to 80 percent
1 Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
2 Congress passed the following laws during the 1970s: Clean Air Act (1970), Federal
Water Pollution Control Act (1972), Federal Insecticide Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
(1972), Noise Control Act (1972), Coastal Zone Management Act (1972), Marine Mammal
Protection Act (1972), Endangered Species Act (1973), Safe Drinking Water Act (1974),
Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act (1974), Magnuson Fishery Con-
servation and Management Act (1976), Federal Coal Leasing Act Amendments (1976),
Toxic Substances Control Act (1976), Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (1976),
National Forest Management Act (1976), Federal Land Policy and Management Act
(1976), Clean Air Act Amendments (1977), Clean Water Act (1977), Surface Mining Con-
trol and Reclamation Act (1977), and Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (1978). See RICH-
ARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 67–75 (2004) (highlighting “the most
significant environmental events of the [1970s], including an overview of the related statu-
tory and institutional changes that occurred”); see also Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Proce-
dure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 59, 66–67 (1992) (describing original 1970
Earth Day as a “republican moment” for lawmaking); Christopher H. Schroeder, Rational
Choice Versus Republican Moment—Explanations for Environmental Laws, 1969–73, 9 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 29, 29 (1998) (“The years between 1969 and 1973 constitute a water-
shed in the evolution of federal environmental policy and legislation.”).
\\server05\productn\C\CRN\94-5\CRN503.txt unknown Seq: 4  7-JUL-09 12:15
1156 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:1153
by 2050 and then maintain that emissions level throughout the twenty-
first century will require Congress to craft an ambitious mix of regula-
tory programs and economic incentives.  Those programs must funda-
mentally change business operations in virtually every economic
sector as well as individual behavior in many aspects of daily life.  To
be effective, the new federal law will also need to include programs
that allow for the adaptation necessary to lessen the serious adverse
public health and welfare effects of climate change that, based on past
emissions levels, will unavoidably occur in the next few decades even if
significant reductions are achieved in the future.  Finally, the federal
legislation will have to strike a proper balance between the federal
government’s need to maintain a country-wide legal regime suffi-
ciently stable to achieve these essential national objectives and the
states’ sovereign authority over activities within their own borders.3
The inherent problem with such lawmaking moments, however,
is just that: they are moments.  What Congress and the President do
with much fanfare can quickly and quietly slip away in the ensuing
years.  This is famously so in environmental law.4  Subsequent legisla-
tive amendments, limited budgets, appropriations riders, interpretive
agency rulings, massive delays in rulemaking, and simple nonenforce-
ment are more than capable of converting a seemingly uncompromis-
ing legal mandate into nothing more than a symbolic aspirational
statement.  In short, what Congress and the President give, they can
just as easily take away.5
This Article’s central thesis is that making it easy for subsequent
lawmakers to unravel, undermine, or even formally change existing
law is not always desirable, and it is certainly not an essential feature of
our democratic lawmaking system.  Lawmakers should instead be un-
derstood as possessing the authority to anticipate and respond in the
first instance to the dynamic nature of lawmaking and its related chal-
3 The exclusive focus of this Article is federal rather than state legislation, with the
exception of some related discussion of potential federal preemption of state law.  This
focus is not intended to intimate that states do not have (as they already have had) a major
role to play in climate change law in the future.  Clearly, they do.  Many of the lawmaking
design features that I describe in this Article may lend themselves to use by the states.  And
the states no doubt already use some techniques of which I am unaware.
4 See Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative Compliance
in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 298–99 (1999) (“It could almost be
said . . . [that] slippage is actually the primary feature of the system: the so-called standards
are important only because they help channel the informal interactions between agencies
and regulated parties.”); see also Richard J. Lazarus, Congressional Descent: The Demise of Delib-
erative Democracy in Environmental Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 619, 638–52 (2006) (describing the rise
of environmental appropriations legislation).
5 ERIC M. PATASHNIK, REFORMS AT RISK: WHAT HAPPENS AFTER MAJOR POLICY CHANGES
ARE ENACTED 3 (2008) (“Rather than a one-shot static affair, policy reform must be seen as
a dynamic process, in which political forces seeking to protect a general-interest reform may
be opposed by forces seeking to undermine it.”).
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lenges, which do not end with the formal enactment of much-needed
legislation.  The same powerful short-term impulses that seek to pre-
vent a law’s enactment do not disappear upon the law’s passage.  They
instead typically remain to seek the law’s ultimate undoing.
Lawmakers should not ignore but legitimately account for that possi-
bility in the first instance, especially for climate change legislation, be-
cause failure to do so could significantly limit rather than promote the
ability of future generations to govern themselves.  To be sure, cur-
rent lawmakers may well be making it more difficult for future legisla-
tors and agency officials to substitute their views of sound policy for
the judgment of past lawmakers.  Current lawmakers would be doing
so, however, not to enrich themselves at the expense of future genera-
tions.  Instead, given the potentially catastrophic consequences of fail-
ing to reduce greenhouse gas emissions over the longer term, they
would be acting for the very different purpose of safeguarding the
ability of future generations, including their elected representatives,
to have far greater control over their own lives.  This is an especially
legitimate basis for imposing lawmaking restraints notwithstanding
their undemocratic effects.
The critical lesson for climate change legislation, accordingly, is
that the pending lawmaking moment must include the enactment of
provisions specifically designed to maintain the legislation’s ability to
achieve its long-term objectives over the longer term.  Climate change
legislation is peculiarly vulnerable to being unraveled over time for a
variety of reasons, but especially because of the extent to which it im-
poses costs on the short term for the realization of benefits many de-
cades and sometimes centuries later.  Because of its fundamentally
redistributive character, there will invariably be politically and eco-
nomically powerful interests, unhappy with the short-term costs of cli-
mate change legislation, seeking to relax the law’s requirements
either formally or informally.  It is therefore not enough for Congress
to enact a law that mandates tough, immediate controls on green-
house gas emissions.  Nor is it enough for Congress to build into the
new law strong economic incentives that render more palatable the
changes in business and individual behavior necessary for those man-
dates to be accomplished and promote overall economic efficiency.
Much more is needed.  Like much legislation, for climate change
legislation to be successful, the new legal framework must simultane-
ously be flexible in certain respects and steadfast in others.  Flexibility
is necessary to allow for the modification of legal requirements over
time in light of new information.  Steadfastness or “stickiness” is im-
portant to maintain the stability of a law’s requirements over time.
The need for both is particularly great for climate change legislation.
Flexibility is absolutely essential for climate change legislation in light
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of the enormity of the undertaking, both in its temporal and spatial
reach, and the surrounding uncertainty concerning the wisdom of
specific regulatory approaches.  Yet the basic legal framework and le-
gal mandate must also be steadfast enough to be maintained over the
long term notwithstanding what will be an unrelenting barrage of ex-
tremely powerful short-term economic interests that will inevitably
seek the mandate’s relaxation.
To that end, the law will need to include institutional design fea-
tures that allow for such flexibility but insulate programmatic imple-
mentation to a significant extent from powerful political and
economic interests propelled by short-term concerns.  Such design
features will include “precommitment strategies”6 that deliberately
make it hard (but never impossible) to change the law in response to
some kinds of concerns.  At the same time, the legislation should also
include contrasting  precommitment strategies that deliberately make
it easier to change the law  in response to other longer-term concerns
that are in harmony with the law’s central purpose, which is to achieve
and maintain greenhouse gas emissions reductions over time.  Such
concerns are otherwise less likely to have powerful voices in lawmak-
ing fora.
Directed to all three branches of government, such institutional
design features should therefore be deliberately asymmetric, making
it easier to change the law in one substantive direction rather than
another.  Like the classic children’s board game Chutes and Ladders,
the design of climate change law should include chutes that make it
harder for certain kinds of changes to be made and ladders that make
it easier for other kinds of changes to be accomplished and for the
overall statutory purpose to be achieved over time.  Climate change
law should further include a series of other structural features deliber-
ately designed to keep the statute on track over time within the execu-
tive branch in particular.  These features include a series of
requirements for consultation with other agencies, scientific advisory com-
mittees, and stakeholders more insulated from short-term political
pressures; statutory and regulatory hammers and judicial review provisions
that ensure timely implementation; and preemption triggers that accom-
modate the prerogatives of competing sovereigns while also exploiting
the resulting tension as leverage to further climate change policy.
The purpose of this Article is to explain why such asymmetric in-
stitutional design features are a critical, legitimate aspect of global cli-
mate change legislation here in the United States and how such
features might operate.  The Article is divided into three parts.  The
first part highlights the distinct features of the lawmaking challenges
6 See infra note 138 and accompanying text.
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presented by global climate change that render it a “super wicked
problem” for public policy resolution and therefore legal redress.
These challenges include both those that derive exclusively from the
underlying science of climate and those that derive more immediately
from human nature and the nature of U.S. lawmaking institutions.
The second part explains the central role that institutional design fea-
tures can play in responding to these kinds of lawmaking challenges.
This explanation is both historical and theoretical.  It describes why
such design features are necessary and legitimate, notwithstanding the
constraints that they place on future lawmaking, and how such fea-
tures have historically been used in various settings to overcome cer-
tain kinds of lawmaking challenges.  Finally, the third part of the
Article offers a menu of possible institutional design features that
might be appropriate in global climate change legislation.
I
THE CHALLENGES OF CLIMATE CHANGE LEGISLATION:
A “SUPER WICKED PROBLEM”
Even once one accepts the current scientific consensus that sig-
nificant global climate change is happening, human activities are a
significant contributing cause of that change, and the associated pub-
lic health and welfare impacts are sufficiently serious to warrant cli-
mate change legislation,7 crafting that legislation is extraordinarily
difficult.  Scholars long ago characterized a public-policy problem
with the kinds of features presented by climate change as a “wicked
problem” that defies resolution because of the enormous interdepen-
dencies, uncertainties, circularities, and conflicting stakeholders im-
plicated by any effort to develop a solution.8  Sometimes described as
7 The purpose of this Article is not to rehash the threshold question of whether
human activities causing global climate change are sufficiently serious to warrant climate
change legislation that seeks a major reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.  In light of
recent scientific studies, this Article assumes the propriety of such legislation and considers
the next step of how best to draft that legislation to accomplish its goals. See INTERGOVERN-
MENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:
IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 7, 8–22 (Martin Parry et al. eds., 2007) [hereinaf-
ter IPCC Summary for Policymakers, IMPACTS], available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assess-
ment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-spm.pdf (summarizing “the impacts of climate change on
natural, managed and human systems” and the adaptability and vulnerability of those sys-
tems); INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Summary for Policymakers, in CLI-
MATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 1–18 (Susan Solomon et al. eds., 2007)
[hereinafter IPCC Summary for Policymakers, PHYSICAL SCIENCE], available at http://www.
ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg1/ar4-wg1-spm.pdf (summarizing findings on
global climate change and presenting options and long-term perspective to policymakers).
8 See generally Horst W. J. Rittel & Melvin M. Webber, Dilemmas in a General Theory of
Planning, 4 POL’Y SCI. 155, 160–69 (1973) (introducing the term “wicked problems” to
describe nature of social policy problems); see also JEFF CONKLIN, DIALOGUE MAPPING: BUILD-
ING SHARED UNDERSTANDING OF WICKED PROBLEMS 3–40 (2006).
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“social messes,” classic wicked problems include AIDS, healthcare, and
terrorism.9
Climate change, however, has been fairly described as a “super
wicked problem” because of its even further exacerbating features.10
These features include the fact that time is not costless, so the longer
it takes to address the problem, the harder it will be to do so.11  As
greenhouse gas emissions continue to increase, exponentially larger,
and potentially more economically disruptive, emissions reductions
will be necessary in the future to bring atmospheric concentrations
down to desired levels.12  Future technological advances, therefore,
would likewise have to be able to achieve those exponentially greater
reductions to make up for lost time.  The climate change that hap-
pens in the interim may itself cause sufficient economic disruption,
for instance, by slowing growth rates, so as to make it much harder to
accomplish the necessary technological innovation.
Another problematic characteristic of climate change is that
those who are in the best position to address the problem are not only
those who caused it, but also those with the least immediate incentive
to act within that necessary shorter timeframe.13  The major sources of
greenhouse gas emissions include many of the world’s most powerful
nations, such as the United States, which are not only reluctant to
embrace restrictions on their own economies but are least susceptible
to demands by other nations that they do so.  In addition, by a per-
verse irony, they are also the nations least likely to suffer the most
from climate change that will unavoidably happen in the nearer
term.14
A third feature is the absence of an existing institutional frame-
work of government with the ability to develop, implement, and main-
tain the laws necessary to address a problem of climate change’s
tremendous spatial and temporal scope.15  Climate change is ulti-
9 Robert E. Horn & Robert P. Weber, New Tools for Resolving Wicked Problems:
Mess Mapping and Resolution Mapping Processes 3 (MacroVU(r), Inc. & Strategy Kinetics
LLC, 2007), available at http://www.strategykinetics.com//New_Tools_For_Resolving_
Wicked_Problems.pdf.  I owe special thanks to Professor Douglas Kysar for notifying me
about “wicked” analysis in his comments on an early draft of this article.
10 See Kelly Levin et al., Playing It Forward: Path Dependency, Progressive Incre-
mentalism, and the “Super Wicked” Problem of Global Climate Change 8–10 (July 7, 2007)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available at http://environment.yale.edu/
uploads/publications/2007levinbernsteincashoreauldWicked-Problems.pdf (“Although
the challenges of climate change and many other complex environmental and social
problems are captured by the above characteristics, climate poses three additional features
that render it a ‘super wicked problem.’”).
11 See id. at 8–9.
12 See infra notes 39–42 and accompanying text. R
13 See Levin et al., supra note 10, at 9. R
14 See infra text accompanying notes 59–66. R
15 See Levin et al., supra note 10, at 9; infra text accompanying note 42. R
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mately a global problem.  But there is an absence of any global law-
making institution with a jurisdictional reach and legal authority that
match the scope of the problem.16
Each of these features, which I discuss in more detail below, re-
lates to the science of climate change, human nature, and the nature
of U.S. lawmaking institutions.  They present significant obstacles
both to the enactment of climate change legislation in the first in-
stance and to its successful implementation over time.
A. The Science of Climate Change
The science of climate change has several distinct features that
render lawmaking especially difficult.  As I describe below, these in-
clude the physics and chemistry underlying climate change as well as
the resulting impacts of such change on humankind and the global
ecosystem.
1. The Greenhouse Effect
Although ultimately riddled with complexities, the basic science
of climate change is fairly straightforward.  As the concentration of
certain chemicals in the atmosphere increases, the amount of heat
from sunlight in the form of infrared radiation that would otherwise
simply reflect off the earth’s surface and radiate back into space is
instead captured within our atmosphere.  This process works like a
“greenhouse,” which is why it is popularly referred to as a “greenhouse
effect” and also why those chemicals that capture higher concentra-
tions of heat are known as “greenhouse gases.”17
Carbon dioxide (CO2) is one of several significant greenhouse
gases, and a CO2 molecule’s potential to capture heat is actually far
less than others’, such as methane, by several orders of magnitude.18
16 See William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory
Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1, 13 (2003) (“Global warming also confronts no matching or com-
mensurate political or legal regime that . . . is logically situated to take the lead and address
global warming’s causes and anticipated harms.”).
17 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Historical Overview of Climate
Change Science, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 93, 103, 105–06, 115
(Susan Solomon et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter IPCC Historical Overview], available at http:/
/www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg1/ar4-wg1-chapter1.pdf (providing a histori-
cal overview of scientists’ understanding of the greenhouse effect); INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Technical Summary, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL
SCIENCE BASIS 19, 23–28 (Susan Solomon et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter IPCC Technical
Summary], available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg1/ar4-wg1-ts.pdf
(providing a technical summary of greenhouse gases); see also R.T. Pierrehumbert, Climate
Change: A Catastrophe in Slow Motion, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 573, 573–74 (2006) (discussing
human-induced emissions).
18 See Jennifer Woodward, Turning Down the Heat: What United States Laws Can Do to
Help Ease Global Warming, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 203, 210 (1989) (“In amounts comparable to
carbon dioxide, other gases are also currently adding to the greenhouse effect.  Although
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The reason CO2 is nonetheless the subject of so much attention is
because the natural concentrations in the atmosphere are relatively
small compared to the volume of CO2 emissions now being added by
human activities.19  Although the largest source of CO2 emissions his-
torically was volcanic activity, fossil-fuel burning alone adds fifteen
times that supplied by volcanoes each year, and that ratio is rapidly
increasing.20  The now-famous “hockey-stick” graphs depicting the
dramatic and accelerating rise in CO2 atmospheric concentrations
during the last one hundred years and the corresponding rise in
global temperatures illustrate the essential relationship between CO2
and global warming as a matter of scientific cause and effect.21
Exacerbating the additions of CO2 to the atmosphere from classic
sources of pollution, especially power plants and motor vehicles, are
other human activities that dramatically eliminate nature’s ability to
take CO2 out of the atmosphere.  There are several natural “sinks”
that can decrease greenhouse gas concentrations by taking those gases
out of the atmosphere.22  If those sinks were increasing in capacity
while the sources were increasing their emissions, there would be no
net greenhouse effect.  But just the opposite is happening: the num-
ber and capacity of those natural sinks are decreasing.23
scientists have identified at least a dozen trace greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, the
most significant gases are chlorofluorocarbons, methane, nitrous oxide, and tropospheric
ozone.”) (citations omitted).
19 See Pierrehumbert, supra note 17, at 574–75 (“It is because there is relatively little R
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere that human economic activity has the prospect of doub-
ling its concentration within the twenty-first century, with greater increases in sight thereaf-
ter.”); see also IPCC Historical Overview, supra note 17, at 108 (concluding that “emissions R
resulting from human activities are substantially increasing the atmospheric concentra-
tions of the greenhouse gases: CO2, CH4, CFCs, N2O”); IPCC Technical Summary, supra note
17, at 23–27 (providing technical summary of increases in atmospheric carbon dioxide, R
methane and nitrous oxide); National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration, Global
Warming: Frequently Asked Questions (Aug. 20, 2008), http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/cli-
mate/globalwarming.html#Q2 (“The global concentration of CO2 in our atmosphere to-
day far exceeds the natural range over the last 650,000 years of 180 to 300 ppmv.
According to the IPCC Special Report on Emission Scenarios (SRES), by the end of the
21st century, we could expect to see carbon dioxide concentrations of anywhere from 490
to 1260 ppm (75–350% above the pre-industrial concentration”).).
20 Pierrehumbert, supra note 17, at 576. R
21 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Changes in Atmospheric Constitu-
ents and in Radioactive Forcing, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 99,
134 fig.2.2 (Susan Solomon et al. eds., 2007); see also David R. Hodas, State Law Responses to
Global Warming: Is It Constitutional to Think Globally and Act Locally?, 21 PACE ENVTL. L. REV.
53, 61 (2003) (detailing the human connection to the rise in carbon dioxide levels since
1900).
22 See Karen N. Scott, The Day After Tomorrow: Ocean CO2 Sequestration and the Future of
Climate Change, 18 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 57, 58–59 (2005) (discussing the ocean as
“both a natural sink and a reservoir for CO2”).
23 See, e.g., id. at 59 (“[T]he response of the ocean carbon cycle to changes in atmos-
pheric CO2 levels is slow, being limited by both chemical and physical factors.”).
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For instance, plants are a major sink of CO2.24  Plants absorb CO2
and release oxygen in a biochemical process (photosynthesis) neces-
sary to produce energy: the fascinating converse of the process by
which animals breathe in oxygen and release CO2.  Plant absorption
of CO2 has historically served as a significant means of keeping CO2
concentrations in the atmosphere in check.25  Because, however, de-
velopment activities throughout the globe have literally cleared mas-
sive landscapes of vegetation, including some of the densest tropical
rainforests, the ecosystem’s ability to reduce atmospheric CO2 concen-
trations has dramatically decreased at the very moment that it is most
needed.  Even worse, those same development activities emit huge
volumes of CO2 gas into the atmosphere by burning the vegetation,
which releases the CO2 otherwise absorbed within the vegetation’s
chemical makeup.26
Finally, the greenhouse effect is a global phenomenon, not one
that occurs in some parts of the world and not others.  Atmospheric
concentrations of greenhouse gases are uniform throughout the at-
mosphere;27 they do not differ over distinct parts of the globe.  A mol-
24 See id. at 58 (stating that terrestrial vegetation is a natural mechanism that removes
CO2 from the atmosphere); Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations,
Roles of Forests in Climate Change (Feb. 4, 2009), http://www.fao.org/forestry/53459/
en/.
25 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Couplings Between Changes in
the Climate System and Biogeochemistry, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS
514 (Susan Solomon et al. eds., 2007) (discussing plants’ role in stabilizing atmospheric
carbon dioxide concentrations).
26 See Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, supra note 24; see R
also INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, LAND USE, LAND-USE CHANGE, AND
FORESTRY 207–08 (Robert T. Watson et al. eds., 2000) (“Burning . . . represents a short-
term transfer of carbon from grassland ecosystems to the atmosphere . . . .  Increasing fire
frequency over time tends to reduce grass biomass production . . . result[ing] in declines in
soil carbon pools . . . .”); INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Changes in At-
mospheric Constituents and in Radiative Forcing, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCI-
ENCE BASIS 135 (Susan Solomon et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter IPCC Changes]; IPCC
Technical Summary, supra note 17, at 26; Yadvinder Malhi et al., Climate Change, Deforestation, R
and the Fate of the Amazon, 319 SCIENCE 169, 170–71 (2008) (discussing the effect of forest
burning in the Amazon); Ma´rcio Santilli et al., Tropical Deforestation and the Kyoto Protocol, 71
CLIMATIC CHANGE 267, 269 (2005); Tom Knudson, ‘Green’ Storage in Forests May Be Going Up
in Smoke; Study: Wildfires Emit More Global Warming Gases than Thought, SACRAMENTO BEE,
Mar. 12, 2008, at A3 (discussing the implications of the greenhouse gases emitted from
California wildfires on the state’s efforts to reduce emissions from human activity).
27 The impact of CO2 emissions on climate change turns on atmospheric concentra-
tions of CO2 in the troposphere, which become uniform around the globe. See IPCC
Changes, supra note 26, at 137–40; A. Denny Ellerman, Tradable Permits for Greenhouse Gas R
Emissions: A Primer with Particular Reference to Europe, 69 MIT JOINT PROGRAM ON SCI. & POL’Y
GLOBAL CHANGE 2 (2000), available at http://web.mit.edu/globalchange/www/
MITJPSPGC_Rpt69.pdf (“A ton of CO2 emitted or abated in Bombay will have the same
effect on climate as a ton emitted or abated in Buenos Aires, Chicago, Kiev, or Stock-
holm.”); see also PETER FOLGER, THE CARBON CYCLE: IMPLICATIONS FOR CLIMATE CHANGE AND
CONGRESS 2 (Congressional Research Service Report, Mar. 13, 2008), available at http://
www.usembassy.at/en/download/pdf/carbon_cycle.pdf (“[W]here fossil fuels are burned
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ecule of carbon dioxide added by a source in New Zealand
accordingly has the same effect on CO2 concentrations as a molecule
added by a source in Kansas, Brazil, or Sweden.28
What are the related lawmaking challenges?  The first is that both
sources of greenhouse gases and potential sinks of greenhouse gases
are relevant.  Laws concerned with addressing the greenhouse effect
need to consider the possibility of reducing sources while also increas-
ing the capacity of sinks.  The second lawmaking challenge is that any
effective climate change legislation must include, of course, domestic
controls, but no domestic legislation is enough standing alone.  Even
if one or many nations decrease their emissions rates or their own
destruction of carbon sinks, those efforts are susceptible to being over-
taken by activities occurring within another nation’s borders.29  Of
particular significance in the United States, a third lawmaking chal-
lenge relates to the need for land use controls.  Land use controls are
federal environmental law’s “third rail” because of the related specter
of federal interference with state and local land use planning.  The
prospect of such federal disruption of state and local governmental
prerogatives to determine land use development patterns has derailed
several efforts by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) over
the years to address air and water pollution caused by particular uses
of land.30
2. Stock/Flow Nature of Atmospheric Chemistry
One of the distinctive features of the science of climate change is
the stock/flow nature of the physical and chemical processes underly-
ing it.  A stock/flow relationship is counterintuitive because it does
not operate like the kind of simple, short-term, more linear relation-
ship between cause and effect that most people (and lawmakers) as-
sume is at work when they contemplate pollution and the options for
its regulation.  Unfortunately, climate change now cannot be avoided
simply by reducing greenhouse gas emissions, much the same way that
one could stop a teakettle from boiling by just turning down the stove.
makes relatively little difference to the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere; emissions
in any one region affect the concentration of CO2 everywhere else in the atmosphere.”)
(emphasis omitted).
28 See sources cited supra note 27. R
29 China has recently passed the United States as the single largest producer of green-
house gas emissions, and India and Brazil are also accelerating their emissions rates. See
infra notes 65–66 and accompanying text. R
30 ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY
716–18 (5th ed. 2006).
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The relevant atmospheric controls for temperature are not so
straightforward.31
The kind of stock/flow relationship that prompts climate change
is instead very different.  Climate change results from the buildup of
greenhouse gases over time, indeed, over centuries.  Unlike the pollu-
tants in most ecological contexts, once added to the atmosphere,
greenhouse gases remain there for a very long time—not just decades,
or even centuries, but thousands of years.  The pollutants do not natu-
rally dissipate in significant amounts.  And so long as the amount of
greenhouse gases being emitted into the atmosphere is greater than
the amount that naturally falls out every year, greenhouse gas concen-
trations increase over time.  Of course, that is exactly what has been
happening, and at an accelerating rate.32
The most accessible description of the stock/flow relationship
that I have encountered is to contemplate the atmosphere as the
equivalent of a bathtub that has been filling with water over time be-
cause the pipe adding water into the tub is much larger than the drain
coming out of the tub.33  In the “tub” of the atmosphere, while the
metaphorical emissions pipe coming in has gotten much larger, the
drain has gotten much smaller for two distinct reasons.  The first, as
earlier discussed, is the destruction of vegetation that would otherwise
have absorbed some CO2 from the atmosphere by way of photosynthe-
sis.  The second is the ocean, which also provides a natural sink in
which some greenhouse gases like CO2 can dissolve.  As, however, the
concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere have in-
creased, the ocean’s capacity to dissolve additional greenhouse gases
out of the atmosphere is diminishing because the ocean is filling up
beyond its chemical capacity to dissolve more gases.
The practical implications of such a stock/flow relationship are
significant, particularly temporally.  First, because the high concentra-
tions of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere are the result of decades
of buildup and natural drainage is very slow, those high concentra-
tions cannot be reduced easily or quickly.  It will require not just a
decrease in the rate of emissions increases but in the absolute amount
of emissions each year.  And even if annual emissions are reduced
considerably, the atmospheric concentrations will continue to in-
crease until those annual increases are less than the annual drain-
31 See John D. Sterman & Linda Booth Sweeney, Understanding Public Complacency
About Climate Change: Adults’ Mental Models of Climate Change Violate Conservation of Matter, 80
CLIMATIC CHANGE 213, 214–15, 222–28 (2007).
32 See Pierrehumbert, supra note 17, at 576–77. R
33 Sterman & Sweeney, supra note 31, at 235. R
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age.34  The bathtub may fill up more slowly but the water will still be
rising.
Finally, even if one manages to achieve annual emissions that are
lower than the annual drainage, it will likely take many decades to
lower the atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations.  And until
those concentrations are substantially lower, climate change will con-
tinue to occur.  For example, for every kilogram of CO2 added to the
atmosphere today, one quarter of that amount will remain in the at-
mosphere for five hundred to one thousand years, and approximately
7 percent will persist in the atmosphere for hundreds of thousands of
years.35  That’s a long time.
But even the stock/flow characteristic of atmospheric concentra-
tions of greenhouse gas is only half of the time lag that renders re-
dressing climate change problematic.  A comparable stock/flow
relationship exists in the atmosphere for the buildup of radiative heat.
Just as greenhouse gas concentrations build up over lengthy periods
of time, radiative heat does so too.36  For that reason, there is, in ef-
fect, not just one bathtub in the atmosphere, but two: one for green-
house gases and one for radiative heat, with the former adding heat to
the latter.  And here too, the heat builds up in the second bathtub so
long as the amount of heat being added is greater than the heat drain-
ing out.37
The practical implication of adding yet one more stock/flow rela-
tionship to the global-warming equation is stark.  It means that even
once one achieves an absolute reduction of greenhouse gases, after
decades of effort, one will not see any resulting decrease of heat.  The
decrease will occur only after the amount of heat being added as a
result of greenhouse gas concentrations gets so low that it is less than
the heat being drained.38  A reduction in additional heat will other-
wise only decrease the rate of global-warming increases, but not actu-
ally result in a temperature decrease.
What are the related lawmaking challenges?  Here again, there are
several.
The first challenge is that major reductions will clearly be neces-
sary.  It will not be enough to slow the rate of increases or even to
34 Id. at 215–16.
35 Pierrehumbert, supra note 17, at 577. R
36 See IPCC Summary for Policymakers, PHYSICAL SCIENCE, supra note 7, at 13. R
37 Sterman & Sweeney, supra note 31, at 215; see also IPCC Summary for Policymakers, R
PHYSICAL SCIENCE, supra note 7, at 13 (referring to model experiments showing that even if R
all radiative forcing agents remained constant at the 2000 levels, further warming would
take place primarily as a result of slow ocean response).
38 See Sterman & Sweeney, supra note 31, at 215 (noting that warming would continue R
until both greenhouse gas concentrations fell and global mean temperature rose enough
to restore net radiative balance).
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decrease absolute annual emissions.  As just described, only if emis-
sions are lower than drainage will greenhouse gas concentrations de-
crease, and even then reduction in atmospheric heat will not occur
until the net radiative heat being added by greenhouse gases is less
than the amount draining out.
The second challenge is that there will necessarily be a huge lag
between the time reductions in greenhouse gas emissions occur and
any mitigating effect on climate change.  The time lag is at the very
least longer than the lifetime of any adult.  The upshot is that no one
who is asked to curtail activities to reduce greenhouse gas concentra-
tions will be likely to live long enough to enjoy the benefits of that
curtailment.
The related lawmaking implication is that many of the measures
that can make a significant difference for current lives are adaptation
measures rather than mitigation measures designed to reduce emis-
sions.  Much of the climate change that is going to occur in our life-
times is unavoidable.  We can still reduce greenhouse gas emissions to
avoid accelerating even worse effects, but all that can done about that
now-unavoidable change is to address the needs of those who will be
most adversely affected and develop ways to adapt to climate change
that will minimize its adverse effects and perhaps take advantage of
some new opportunities that it presents.
A third significant challenge is that the enormous temporal
dimensions of climate change, potentially crossing multiple genera-
tions, resist easy application of the kind of cost-benefit analysis many
policymakers favor for the setting of environmental protection stan-
dards.  The proper role of cost-benefit analysis has long been debated
in environmental law, with many commentators strongly in favor and
others sharply critical of the efficacy and fairness of such analysis.39
But, ignoring the tendency of climate change to raise the kinds of
value conflicts that detractors of cost-benefit analysis claim it is ill-
suited to measure,40 the temporal dimension alone renders heavy reli-
39 See generally MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: LEGAL,
ECONOMIC, AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES (2001) (reproducing a series of articles offer-
ing contrasting perspectives on the efficacy of cost-benefit analysis).
40 See, e.g., RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: HOW
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH 55–147
(2008) (detailing the “fallacies” of cost-benefit analysis); Frank Ackerman & Lisa
Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L.
REV. 1553, 1562–81 (2002) (showing that the attempt of cost-benefit analysis to put prices
on priceless values and to discount harms makes it a poor way to evaluate environmental
protection regulation); David M. Driesen, Distributing the Costs of Environmental, Health, and
Safety Protection: The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Regulatory Reform, 32 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 64–94 (2005) (arguing that the principle requiring maximum feasi-
ble emissions reductions is a more appropriate method for considering costs in the context
of most technology-based standards).
\\server05\productn\C\CRN\94-5\CRN503.txt unknown Seq: 16  7-JUL-09 12:15
1168 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:1153
ance on cost-benefit analysis problematic at the very least.  Proffering
a discount rate for valuing costs and benefits that will be realized or
avoided only centuries in the future and under completely uncertain
societal conditions is heroic, foolish, or a mixture of both.41  But in no
event does it provide an especially solid basis for making confident
policy choices today.42
A final lawmaking challenge that derives from the stock/flow na-
ture of climate change is that lawmaking delays are costly.  The longer
one waits, the more dramatic the necessary reductions in emissions.
The reason is simple.  With every year of delay, greenhouse gas con-
centrations and radiative heat levels increase and, no less important,
the economic interests in maintaining increasingly high rates of emis-
sions get ever more deeply entrenched.  Power plants, for instance,
have long life spans.  It is much harder to change direction after mas-
sive investments have been made in their construction and operation.
This problem is present with many other parts of our nation’s energy
infrastructure that currently depend on the emission of huge volumes
of greenhouse gases.43
3. Spatial Dimension of Climate Change: Global Cause vs. Global
Effect
Although atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gas concen-
trations are uniform around the globe, the impacts of those concen-
trations are not similarly uniform.  Hence, although the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and other scien-
tific bodies routinely refer to increases in average global temperature,
that does not mean that every part of the globe will in fact experience
the same temperature increase.  That “average” instead masks substan-
tial differences in temperature increases.  For some parts of the world,
the temperature increase will be much greater than for other parts.44
Even more important, considered in isolation, temperature in-
creases mask the much larger differences in resulting worldwide im-
pacts.  The impacts of any increase in temperature on public health,
41 For a discussion of the challenges of discounting in the context of climate change,
see ERIC A. POSNER, CASS SUNSTEIN & DAVID WEISBACH, CLIMATE CHANGE JUSTICE (forthcom-
ing 2008) (manuscript at 127–45, on file with author).
42 See Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg.
44,354, 44,414–16 (proposed July 30, 2008) (describing the host of limitations of economic
analysis, especially cost-benefit analysis, as applied to a problem with enormous spatial and
temporal dimensions like climate change).
43 Kelly Sims Gallagher, Acting in Time on Climate Change 9–10 (Sept. 18–19, 2008)
(unpublished conference paper, presented at Acting in Time on Energy Policy Conference
at Harvard University), available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/actingintime-
onenergy/papers/gallagher-climate.pdf (describing long lifetimes of investments in en-
ergy infrastructure and impact on timing and cost of climate change policy).
44 See IPCC Summary for Policymakers, PHYSICAL SCIENCE, supra note 7, at 9. R
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welfare, and the environment are highly dependent on geographic
location.45  What might even be a potentially beneficial increase in
one part of the world could be a completely devastating effect
elsewhere.46
For instance, the impact of a given increase in temperatures turns
on factors such as the ways the wind blows, water flows, and the Earth
spins in its orbit around the sun.47  For those parts of the globe where
water may already be scarce, an increase in temperature can quickly
result in severe droughts and famines, leading to mass migrations of
hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of people.48  For those parts of
the world where people live close to the ocean in low-lying elevations
vulnerable to flooding, rising sea levels could literally wipe out entire
island nations and coastal cities.  And for those parts of the world
where, because of preexisting higher temperatures, many of the
world’s diseases originate, even higher temperatures could both pro-
mote the development of new diseases and increase their ability to
spread further around the globe.49
By contrast, in other parts of the world, increased temperatures
might even seem to yield some benefits, at least in the short term.50
In higher latitudes, an increase in temperature might lengthen the
growing season and thereby offer a potential boost in agricultural pro-
ductivity.51  Some scholars have made just that claim with respect to
45 See IPCC Summary for Policymakers, IMPACTS, supra note 7, at 11–18. R
46 See id. at 10 fig.1 (presenting a chart showing that increased temperatures will cause
increased water availability in moist tropics but decreased water availability in mild, and
some low, latitudes); INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Summary for Policy-
makers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT 8–13 (The Core Writing Team et al.
eds., 2007) [hereinafter IPCC Summary for Policymakers, SYNTHESIS], available at http://www.
ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_spm.pdf (listing and discussing different
regional impacts); Anthony J. McMichael et al., Global Climate Change, in 1 COMPARATIVE
QUANTIFICATION OF HEALTH RISKS: GLOBAL AND REGIONAL BURDEN OF DISEASE ATTRIBUTA-
BLE TO SELECTED MAJOR RISK FACTORS 1543 (Majid Ezzati et al. eds, 2004)
47 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Frequently Asked Questions, in
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 94–97  (Susan Solomon et al. eds.,
2007).
48 See IPCC Summary for Policymakers, IMPACTS, supra note 7, at 12; IPCC Summary for R
Policymakers, SYNTHESIS, supra note 46, at 8–13; McMichael et al., supra note 46. R
49 IPCC Summary for Policymakers, SYNTHESIS, supra note 46, at 8–13; see Pierrehumbert, R
supra note 17, at 578–79 (describing non-uniform impacts). R
50 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Food, Fibre and Forest Products,
in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 273, 284 (Martin Parry
et al. eds., 2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-
wg2-chapter5.pdf; INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Industry, Settlement and
Society, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 357, 365 (Martin
Parry et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter IPCC Industry], available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/
assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-chapter7.pdf; IPCC Summary for Policymakers, IMPACTS,
supra note 7, at 12. R
51 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Human Health, in CLIMATE
CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 391, 411 (Martin Parry et al. eds.,
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wine production.52  Similarly, although higher temperatures in the
Arctic may sound the death knell for certain species, such as the polar
bear, and for certain native villages, melting ice could open up new
passageways for marine transportation and access to energy
resources.53
There is also a reason why the problem is defined not as “global
warming” per se but as global climate change.  Changes in temperature
are simply the first in a chain reaction of ecosystem changes.54  The
changes in climate that result from changes in temperature are highly
dependent on location.55  Some places may get more rain; other
places may get less.  Some places may get more damaging weather
patterns; others may not.  If, as some scientists suggest, changing tem-
peratures can shift the ocean currents, such as the Gulf Stream, and
melt polar ice, the variation in global impacts will be even more pro-
nounced.56  To be sure, if some of the most catastrophic conse-
quences—including dramatic sea level rises and global spread of
infectious diseases—occur over the longer term, there will be signifi-
cant absolute costs everywhere.57  But, the consequences of climate
change from uniform atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases
will not be the same everywhere, certainly in the nearer term and not
in the distant future, which is another defining feature of the science
of climate change.58
What are the related lawmaking challenges?  Here again, there are sev-
eral and all are quite formidable.
The most significant challenge is that although all parts of the
world can influence global climate change, not all parts of the world
will suffer equally if such change occurs.  Indeed, some parts of the
world will suffer potentially catastrophic effects, even with a rise of just
a few degrees, while other parts of the world will suffer relatively little
and may even believe that they are enjoying some short-term eco-
nomic benefits.  Such distributional differences will make it much
harder to achieve the international cooperation and coordination
necessary to address the problem.
2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-chapter8.
pdf.
52 See, e.g., A. B. Tate, Global Warming’s Impact on Wine, 12 J. OF WINE RES. 95, 96–97
(2001) (suggesting potential short-term beneficial effects of higher temperatures on wine
production).
53 IPCC Summary for Policymakers, IMPACTS, supra note 7, at 15; McMichael et al., supra R
note 46.
54 See IPCC Summary for Policymakers, IMPACTS, supra note 7, at 17. R
55 See id. at 13–15.
56 See id. at 17; Pierrehumbert, supra note 17, at 578–79 (describing non-uniform R
impacts).
57 See IPCC Summary for Policymakers, IMPACTS, supra note 7, at 11–12,17–20. R
58 See supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text.
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But what makes addressing the problem seemingly insurmounta-
ble is that the parts of the world that are most directly threatened are
completely different from those that are the primary sources of green-
house gases now in the atmosphere.  Those parts of the globe most
threatened, especially areas near the equator and of high elevation,
are also some of the world’s poorest and have the least-developed gov-
ernments.59  Populations in these areas, such as parts of Africa and
Asia, often lack basic shelter, health care facilities, a diversified econ-
omy, and a government able to deliver basic social services in times of
stress.  Their ability to adapt to climate change is consequently
minimal.60
In tragic contrast, the most highly industrialized nations that have
emitted the vast majority of greenhouse gases over the past one hun-
dred years—including the United States, Russia, and much of Western
Europe—are located almost exclusively in the higher latitudes in the
northern hemisphere.61  These are, somewhat perversely, the areas
that are likely to suffer the least in the short term and economic inter-
ests in these areas may even believe that they will enjoy some short-
term benefits.62
59 See, e.g., IPCC Industry, supra note 50, at 365–66; INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON R
CLIMATE CHANGE, Perspectives on Climate Change and Sustainability, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:
IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 821 (Martin Parry et al. eds., 2007), available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-chapter20.pdf; IPCC Sum-
mary for Policymakers, IMPACTS, supra note 7, at 13; see also Kathryn S. Brown, Taking Global R
Warming to the People, SCIENCE MAG., Mar. 5, 1999, at 1440–41; Michael Grubb, Seeking Fair
Weather: Ethics and the International Debate on Climate Change, 71 INT’L AFF. 463, 467 (1995);
Paul Reiter, Climate Change and Mosquito-Borne Disease, 109 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 141, 142
(2001).
60 See IPCC Summary for Policymakers, IMPACTS, supra note 7, at 12–13; Brown, supra R
note 59, at 1441. R
61 World Resources Institute, Contributions to Global Warming; Historic Carbon Di-
oxide Emissions from Fossil Fuel Combustion, 1900–1999, http://earthtrends.wri.org/
maps_spatial/maps_detail_static.php?map_select=488&theme=3 (last visited Apr. 5, 2009).
62 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Asia, in CLIMATE CHANGE
2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 469, 482 (Martin Parry et al. eds., 2007),
available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-chapter10.pdf;
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Assessing Key Vulnerabilities and the Risk
from Climate Change, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY
779, 796 (Martin Parry et al. eds., 2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-
report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-chapter19.pdf; INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
Europe, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 541, 554, 556
(Martin Parry et al. eds., 2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/
ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-chapter12.pdf; INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Global
Climate Projections, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 747, 782 (Susan
Solomon et al. eds., 2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/
wg1/ar4-wg1-chapter10.pdf (stating that precipitation would increase in northern Eu-
rope); INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, North America, in CLIMATE CHANGE
2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 617, 623 (Martin Parry et al. eds., 2007),
available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-chapter14.pdf;
see also Herman Shugart et al., Forests and Global Climate Change: Potential Impacts on U.S.
Forest Resources, at ii, iv–v, 43 (Pew Center on Global Climate Change, Arlington, Va., Feb.
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Such nations are not only the most responsible for the current
problems, but they are also invariably some of the most politically and
economically powerful nations on the globe.  They are consequently
not readily susceptible to less powerful nations’ efforts to compel
them to reduce their emissions.  Because of their relative wealth, they
are also more easily able to adopt adaptation measures and conse-
quently suffer fewer immediate hardships.
As a result, it will prove extremely difficult in the short run to
persuade the powerful nations responsible for climate change to un-
dertake the dramatic action now needed.  They will not perceive the
benefits for doing so, in part because they will not in fact be the ones
suffering the greatest and most immediate harm.  And by the time
longer-term climate change begins to adversely affect even the more
powerful nations—because of political destabilization caused by mas-
sive migrations, the spread of infectious diseases, dramatic changes
caused by shifts in the Gulf Stream, or melting glaciers—it will be too
late to take action to avoid such greater effects.  As described above,
the stock/flow nature of the atmosphere precludes the normal luxury
of awaiting serious and immediate adversity before taking action.63
There is no scientific reason why such a geographic mismatch be-
tween cause and effect has to exist.  But it does.  It is the result of an
unwittingly perverse combination of the laws of physics and chemistry
with patterns of economic industrialization around the globe.  No
matter how unwitting, however, the resulting obstacle to lawmaking is
correspondingly huge.
Finally, there is yet one more distributional twist that makes
meaningful lawmaking that much harder.  Although it is the long-in-
dustrialized nations, such as the United States, Russia, and those in
Western Europe, that have contributed disproportionately to green-
house gas concentrations now in the atmosphere, there is a new set of
developing nations with exploding economies that has or at least soon
will surpass the developed nations in annual emissions.64  China has
become the single largest producer of greenhouse gases, beating pro-
2003), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/forestry.pdf (stating that the
United States will receive short-term positive benefits from climate change in the sector of
forest resources).
63 See supra Part I.A.2.
64 See Energy Information Administration, Emissions of Greenhouse Gases Report,
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/ggrpt/index.html#developments (last visited Apr. 5,
2009).
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jections of when it would overtake the United States.65  India and Bra-
zil are similarly increasing their emissions at accelerating rates.66
The related lawmaking problem is obvious.  The developed na-
tions, like the United States, are hard pressed to dictate to countries
like China and India that they should not expand their economies by
increasing greenhouse gas emissions.  After all, why should China and
India agree to do so when the United States is primarily responsible
for existing greenhouse gas concentrations and has already enjoyed
decades of economic prosperity and military superiority as a result of
greenhouse gas–producing industries that still produce far greater per
capita emissions than sources in either China or India?  At the same
time, the developed nations like the United States are less likely to
take unilateral action to reduce their emissions if they believe that if
they do, the rapidly developing nations will simply surpass them in
economic strength and simply replace U.S. greenhouse gas emissions
with their own, thereby not reducing climate change at all.
B. Human Nature and Cognitive Psychology
The science of climate change creates a series of forbidding law-
making obstacles that contribute to climate change’s wickedness as a
public policy problem.  But one reason that those obstacles are so po-
tentially overwhelming is because they work in tandem with human
nature.  Whether as a result of hard- or soft-wiring, human beings as a
species tend to think in certain ways.  As described by the field of cog-
nitive psychology, we tend to favor some outcomes over others, are
able to grasp some kinds of concepts more readily than others, and
use a series of mental shortcuts or “heuristics” in making decisions.67
65 Joseph Kahn & Mark Landler, China Grabs West’s Smoke-Spewing Factories, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 21, 2007, at A1; Andy Scott & Lucy Brady, China, Top Producer of Greenhouse Gases, Looks
to Tap Potential Resource, CHINA BRIEFING NEWS, Nov. 2, 2007, available at http://www.china-
briefing.com/news/2007/11/02/china-top-producer-of-greenhouse-gases-looks-to-tap-po-
tential-resource.html; see also China Surpasses U.S. Emissions, INT’L HERALD TRIB., June 21,
2007, LexisNexis Academic.
66 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CLIMATE CHANGE: TRENDS IN GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSIONS AND EMISSIONS INTENSITY IN THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER HIGH EMITTING NA-
TIONS, GAO-04-146R, at 4 (2003); Energy Information Administration, Table H.1co2:
World Carbon Dioxide Emissions from the Consumption and Flaring of Fossil Fuels,
1980–2006, http://www.eia.doe.gov/environment.html (follow “Total Emissions” hyper-
link) (last visited Apr. 5, 2009); see also Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Bush Proposes Goal to Reduce
Greenhouse Gas: Long-Term World Target, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2007, at A1 (listing China and
India as other “top producers” of greenhouse gas emissions).
67 See, e.g., Paul Slovic et al., Cognitive Processes and Societal Risk Taking, in COGNITION
AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR, 165, 168–74 (John S. Carroll & John W. Payne eds., 1976); Amos
Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3, 3–4, 18–20 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds.,
1982); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Government
Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 555–58 (2002).
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As applied to climate change, these cognitive tendencies and limita-
tions produce a “massive social trap.”68
Many of these human tendencies are directly relevant to both
why climate change has occurred and, most important for current
purposes, why lawmaking to address climate change has proven so
hard to establish and will be even harder to maintain over time.  In-
deed, there is almost complete opposition between the kinds of judg-
ments that need to be made to address climate change in a
meaningful way and the kinds of judgments that our basic way of
thinking favors.  Several of the most prominent types of decisions re-
late to the temporal dimension, spatial distribution, and sheer com-
plexity of climate change.
1. Myopia and Climate Change’s Temporal Dimension
As described above, the central feature of climate change is its
temporal dimension.  Cause and effect are spread out enormously
over time.  It is not just a matter of hours, days, weeks, years, or even
mere decades.  There is a delay of many decades and then irreversible,
unavoidable consequences that, once realized, can last for literally
hundreds and sometimes thousands of years.  Addressing climate
change, accordingly, requires people to take action now to redress
consequences that will not occur until far into the future.  Unfortu-
nately, this is precisely the kind of thinking and decision making in
which people do not naturally engage.
We are a species characterized by myopia.69  We “think mostly in
physiological time”70 and, because of natural selection, are subject to
“the forces of psychological denial.”71  We discount future utility and
put off long-term investments in favor of short-term return.  We do
that with decisions in our own lives.  But the tendency is orders of
magnitude larger when the time periods affected by those decisions
extend beyond our own lives, as with climate change, to temporally
distant future generations.
68 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Psychology of Global Climate Change, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 299,
300.
69 See Chrisoula Andreou, Environmental Preservation and Second-Order Procrastination, 35
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 233, 237 (2007); Eerik Lagerspetz, Rationality and Politics in Long-Term
Decisions, 8 BIODIVERSITY & CONSERVATION 149, 150 (1999) (defining myopic thinking and
exploring the differences between that kind of thinking and other rational and irrational
thinking paradigms); Dustin J. Penn, The Evolutionary Roots of Our Environmental Problems:
Toward a Darwinian Ecology, 78 THE Q. REV. OF BIOLOGY 275, 284–85 (2003) (discussing the
human tendency to discount the future).
70 Penn, supra note 69, at 284 (quoting E.O. WILSON, BIOPHILIA: THE HUMAN BOND R
WITH OTHER SPECIES 120 (1984)).
71 Id. at 285 (quoting Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243,
1244 (1968)).
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There are many readily available bases for our deciding to ignore
climate change.  Many relate to the tremendous uncertainty that is
inevitably injected into the decision-making process when cause and
effect are marked by the kind of extraordinary temporal distance con-
templated by climate change.  Such uncertainty makes it that much
easier to conclude, without any obvious selfishness, that it would be
foolish to undertake significant restraints on activity now to avoid con-
sequences in the distant future.  For instance, how can one ever know
what consequences will occur fifty, one hundred, or one thousand
years from now?  Consider how much humankind has transformed in
the last millennium and then what enormous arrogance it would re-
quire for anyone today to claim to know what human society, let alone
environmental consequences, will look like in the far-off future.
Consider the extent to which future technology and scientific
knowledge will change during the next hundreds of years.  Consider
how people’s tastes will profoundly shift.  How foolhardy for today’s
generations to try to anticipate what humankind and the world will
look like then and purport to freeze the present in the guise of pre-
serving the future.  The wisdom of such a self-imposed seizure of
human progress is certainly nowhere suggested by centuries of history
of human civilization.
Addressing climate change by reducing resource consumption
can also be especially difficult to accomplish.  At least on an individual
basis, natural selection has seemingly favored over- rather than under-
consumption.72  Sometimes described as an expression of an innate
human desire to attract mates and exercise dominion, most humans
seek to distinguish themselves by pursuit not of wealth in any absolute
sense, but relative wealth.73  Consumption establishes wealth and so-
cial status, whether in the form of resplendent jewels, clothes, or other
extravagant goods in modern society or the simple consumption of
fats and sugars in earlier times.74
Procrastination, not prescience, is the most likely result.  The nec-
essary laws are not likely to be enacted and, even if they are, they are
likely to be riddled with exceptions or ignored, overridden by the de-
sire to further delay their effectiveness.75  Even worse, just as in Gar-
rett Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons,76 consumption may actually
increase in the short term as each consumer seeks to obtain his or her
share before the common supply is exhausted.  Otherwise, the only
72 See id. at 282–83.
73 See id.
74 Id.
75 See Andreou, supra note 69, at 237–43. R
76 See supra note 71 (describing ‘the tragedy of commons’ as a situation in which every
person is compelled to increase his or her gain “without limit—in a world that is limited”).
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benefit of any one person’s (or nation’s) unilateral temperance is no
more than another person’s (or nation’s) increased exploitation and
the relative impoverishment of the former.
2. The Availability Heuristic, Space, and Complexity
The “availability heuristic” describes the human tendency to
judge the likelihood of an occurrence based on the relative ability to
imagine its happening.77  If one can readily imagine an occurrence—
that is, the possibility is more cognitively “available”—one is apt to
believe that that occurrence is more likely than it in fact is.  In the
field of risk regulation, some commentators have invoked this heuris-
tic as grounds for worrying that government may overregulate private
conduct in order to avoid harms that, although easily imagined, are
extremely unlikely to occur.  They argue that political entrepreneurs,
taking  advantage of “availability cascades,” can enlist public support
in favor of unnecessarily stringent regulation of conduct based on un-
realistic fears.78
Climate change, however, most implicates the mirror image of
the availability heuristic.  There is no reason to suppose that the avail-
ability heuristic’s only policy implication is the tendency to overregu-
late.  Just as problems that can be easily imagined may in theory
prompt overregulation, problems that cannot be easily imagined—and
therefore presumably implicate an “unavailability heuristic”—may be
plagued by underregulation.79  Climate change, of course, is just such
an unimaginable problem.
There are several reasons why climate change is subject to the
“unavailability heuristic.”  First, there is climate change’s spatial di-
mension.  The cause and effect underlying climate change are spread
out over enormous space.  Actions on one part of the globe have con-
sequences for other parts of the globe.  Just as these consequences
lack immediacy in time, they lack immediacy in space, which renders
77 See, e.g., Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 67, at 556 (“[W]hen making judgments R
about the frequency of events, people often rely on the ease with which an instance of a
target event can be called to mind . . . .”). See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John
Ferejohn, Structuring Lawmaking to Reduce Cognitive Bias: A Critical View, 87 CORNELL L. REV.
616 (2002) (analyzing lawmaking through the lens of theories of cognitive psychology);
Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV.
683 (1999) (analyzing availability cascades and suggesting reforms to avoid their potential
harms); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and
Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207 (1973) (exploring how the availability heuristic can
create bias).
78 See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 77, at 742–43, 744–46.  “Availability cascades” are R
“social cascades . . . through which expressed perceptions trigger chains of individual re-
sponses that make these perceptions appear increasingly plausible through their rising
availability in public discourse.” Id. at 685.
79 See id. at 731 n.176 (“The same process can dampen public concern and discourage
governmental activity with respect to dangers that happen to be very serious.”).
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them more difficult to imagine.  Spatial gaps, like temporal gaps, in-
ject uncertainty about whether a particular action is truly having an
alleged impact in a distant location.
Spatially diffuse impacts are especially elusive for the human im-
agination because they inevitably render the consequences effectively
invisible and therefore more abstract.  Moreover, the abstraction is
compounded if the impacts of climate change closer to home are dra-
matically different from those in distant locations.  In the case of
global climate change, of course, such a spatial disparity is not just a
theoretical possibility; it is to be expected.  Some parts of the world
may actually perceive short-term benefits to their economies from cli-
mate change, while other parts of the world may suffer devastating
consequences from such change.  Were those who were suffering the
more immediate harsh consequences the same people who were best
able to address the problem in the future, the discrepancy between
the two would of course present no obstacle to lawmaking.  Some
commentators would no doubt express worry in those circumstances
that the availability heuristic would lead to overreaction to climate
change.  But it is just the opposite.80  Because the greatest sources of
the problem are located in nations that are likely to suffer the least in
the short term, it is that heuristic’s far more evil twin, the unavailabil-
ity heuristic, that threatens lawmaking.
It is not, however, just climate change’s spatial dimension that
implicates the unavailability heuristic.  The stock/flow nature of cli-
mate change, also discussed above,81 does so as well.  People have a
weak intuitive understanding of stock/flow relationships.  In particu-
lar, people do not intuitively grasp how stock can increase even if flow
is decreasing (for example, how the water level in the bathtub can
continue to increase even after one turns the faucet down).82
Indeed, studies have demonstrated that people do not intuitively
understand stock/flow relationships in general, and that they are una-
ble to do so in the context of the science of climate change in particu-
lar.83  In one recent study of graduate students at an elite university,
students were supplied with basic information about the science of
climate change, including the stock/flow relationship, and then they
were asked a series of questions to discern what kinds of steps would
be necessary to reduce global warming.  The students repeatedly
failed to grasp how reductions in flow would not necessarily lead to
80 See, e.g., Paul L. Joffe, The Dwindling Margin for Error: The Realist Perspective on Global
Governance and Global Warming, 5 RUTGERS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 89, 140–41 (2007) (describing
some of the difficulties involved in achieving international cooperation toward sustainable
development, including the disparate concerns of various nations).
81 See supra Part I.A.2.
82 See id.
83 See, e.g., Sterman & Sweeney, supra note 31, at 222–36. R
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stock reduction.  Even for extremely bright students, the relationship
was too complex for ready apprehension.84
3. Representativeness Heuristic and Climate Change Cause and Effect
A third tendency of human cognition is the “representativeness
heuristic.”  This heuristic provides that people can more readily dis-
cern cause and effect if the effect of a given action seems logically
related to the assigned cause.85  It is therefore easy to understand how
striking a match can lead to destruction by fire, or how breaching a
dam can cause damage by flood.
But for that same reason, climate change cause and effect eludes
normal human cognition.  There is nothing logical or intuitive about
the relationship.  How can buying some extra furniture at a discount
store lead to climate change?  Or driving some additional miles in the
family car, which happens to be a SUV?  Or idling unnecessarily while
waiting to pick up a child in the school parking lot?  Or buying a state-
of-the-art high definition television?  Or using power strips and any of
a host of appliances that, for sake of consumer convenience are always
“on” to a certain extent and therefore more immediately usable?86
And, of course, it is not just discernment of the relationship be-
tween ordinary consumer behavior and climate change that would be
necessary.  The harmful consequences of all of this excess consumer
consumption in developed nations, such as the United States, are not
climate change per se.  The harmful consequences are those of cli-
mate change: people literally starving for food and water in already
impoverished areas of the world, especially Africa; the spread of new
and more virulent infectious diseases; flash floods in parts of Asia;
mass migrations of populations in search of food and water; increased
civil unrest and even war as the demand for scarce resources intensi-
fies in places such as the Middle East.87
The undeniable fact is that well-meaning people in developed na-
tions, including our own, are engaging in extraordinarily wasteful and
unnecessary consumption that fuels climate change.88  None of these
84 Id.
85 Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 67, at 11, 24–27. R
86 See generally Michael P. Vandenbergh & Anne C. Steinemann, The Carbon-Neutral
Individual, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1673 (2007) (discussing the contributions that individual ac-
tions make to climate change).
87 See Thomas Homer-Dixon, Environmental Scarcity and Intergroup Conflict, in WORLD
SECURITY: CHALLENGES FOR A NEW CENTURY 342–62 (Michael T. Klare & Yogesh Chandrani
eds., 3d ed. 1998); IPCC Summary for Policymakers, IMPACTS, supra note 7, at 11–18; LAZARUS, R
supra note 2, at 8–15 (discussing potential implications of climate change). R
88 See John C. Dernbach, Harnessing Individual Behavior to Address Climate Change: Op-
tions for Congress, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 107, 144–56 (2008) (discussing legislative measures to
ensure greater individual cooperation with national efforts to address climate change);
Paul R. Ehrlich & Lawrence H. Goulder, Is Current Consumption Excessive?  A General Frame-
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activities would be remotely acceptable were the consequences of
these actions clear.  Their acceptability can be partially attributed to
the clouding effect of temporal and spatial distances.  But it is also
because the complexity of the causal chains makes those conse-
quences seem far removed from the actions that contributed to their
occurrence.89
C. The Nature of U.S. Lawmaking Institutions
The nature of U.S. lawmaking institutions is the third ingredient
that presents obstacles to the enactment of climate change legislation
and its maintenance over time.  Most simply put, the kind of law
needed to address climate change is precisely the kind of law—be-
cause of its enormously redistributive implications—that our lawmak-
ing system deliberately makes difficult to enact in the first instance.
Our lawmaking system also renders such laws especially vulnerable to
second-guessing and derailment over time by Congress, Executive
Branch officials, and judicial review.90  But because the structure of
our lawmaking institutions is the one ingredient that is most suscepti-
ble to ready revision, this final ingredient may well be the most signifi-
cant for current lawmaking purposes.91
1. The Challenges of Environmental Lawmaking in General
I have previously outlined why and how I believe environmental
lawmaking is generally difficult to accomplish through U.S. lawmak-
ing institutions.92  These reasons include the structure of our lawmak-
ing institutions, especially the deliberate fragmentation of lawmaking
authority between sovereigns, within sovereigns, and within branches
of sovereigns.  The reasons also include the political processes for the
election of members of the legislature and executive branch leaders,
work and Some Indications for the United States, 21 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1145, 1153 (2007)
(finding that consumption in many sectors of the U.S. economy is greatly distorted, lead-
ing to excessive fossil fuel usage); Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 86, at R
1699–1700 (explaining that “low-hanging fruit”—behavior change requiring little effort or
cost to be effective—allows individuals to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 60 percent).
89 Professor Jeffrey Rachlinski elaborates on two other significant human cognitive
limitations potentially relevant to climate change: “biased assimilation” and a “loss aversion
and the status quo bias.”  Rachlinski, supra note 68, at 304–08.  The first refers to the ten- R
dency of people to see what they want to see in uncertain data, which he argues can con-
tribute to a polarization of views on climate change; the second refers to the tendency of
people to prefer maintaining the status quo, which can extend to an aversion to incurring
costs for future benefit. Id.
90 See infra Part III.
91 See id.
92 See generally LAZARUS, supra note 2. R
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which are dominated by short-term election cycles and dependence
on massive donations for election campaigning.93
The natural and deliberate effect of fragmenting authority
among branches of government and between sovereign authorities is
to make it more difficult to enact laws.  Great effort is needed to se-
cure the necessary congressional committee approvals; garner major-
ity votes in both chambers; obtain presidential signature; achieve
agency implementation and enforcement; and, if necessary, defeat
challenges in court to the law’s validity.
There is, in short, a strong structural bias within our existing law-
making institutions in favor of government acting slowly and incre-
mentally.94  Whatever their ideological bent, sweeping law reforms in
response to new information or values are very difficult to accomplish
without institutional change, yet those same institutions that need re-
form resist just that possibility.
The features of environmental protection law, moreover, make
reform an especially demanding undertaking.  Because of environ-
mental law’s inherently redistributive thrust, there will almost always
be those resisting the change who, under existing law, possess consid-
erable resources that they will work hard to avoid losing.95  They will
also be able to base their opposition to statutory enactments on the
substantial scientific uncertainty and sheer complexity surrounding
ecological injury.  The latter, in particular, will render the process of
legislating detailed statutory provisions especially difficult.
Environmental law’s inherently dynamic nature creates further
obstacles in that multiple statutes, statutory amendments, and regula-
tory revisions are likely to be necessary over time.  Securing passage of
environmental law is not just a matter of exploiting one opportune
moment in time.  It requires multiple debates and lobbying efforts,
with any one failed effort potentially leading to the aforementioned
irreversible, catastrophic environmental harm.  Environmental law
must be flexible and responsive to new information regarding ecologi-
cal cause and effect, available technology, and changing lifestyles.
The essentially conservative, fragmented, and deliberately cumber-
some process for lawmaking in the United States does not readily lend
itself to such responsive, iterative lawmaking initiatives.
93 I derive the discussion in this subsection from the somewhat fuller analysis in LAZA-
RUS, supra note 2, at 29–42. R
94 See Alan M. Jacobs, The Politics of When: Redistribution, Investment and Policymaking for
the Long Term, 38 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 193, 201 (2008) (arguing that one way to make distribu-
tional tradeoffs harder to accomplish is to spread out lawmaking power, which makes it
harder to enact laws and gives more leverage to potential losers, thereby creating, in effect,
a veto).
95 See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS 2, 53–65 (2d prtg. 1971).
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Fragmentation also makes it difficult to address issues in a com-
prehensive, holistic fashion.  Ecological injury resists narrow redress—
due to the highly interrelated nature of the ecosystem, it is almost
always a mistake to suppose that one can isolate a single, discrete
cause as the source of an environmental problem.  A broader overview
that accounts for the full spatial and temporal dimensions of the mat-
ter is needed.  Failure to pursue such an overview is likely to result in
an approach that is at best ineffective and at worst unwittingly destruc-
tive because of unanticipated consequences.  If, however, governmen-
tal jurisdiction over the host of diverse activities affecting the
ecosystem is divided among many entities, necessary coordination and
overview are surprisingly difficult.
The institutional obstacle of fragmentation not only arises among
the various branches, but also within them.  Fragmentation of con-
gressional committee jurisdiction over environmental issues is inevita-
ble given the ways in which ecological cause and effect span so many
diverse human activities.  Environmental law will invariably implicate
the interests not just of congressional committees concerned with en-
vironmental law per se, but also of most major committees concerned
with various aspects of the economy and society potentially subject to
environmental regulations—the tremendous spatial and temporal
dimensions of ecological injury guarantee it.
Moreover, because of the separation of authorizing committees
and appropriations committees in both congressional chambers,
there are likely to be powerful factions on appropriations committees
particularly skeptical of the thrust of environmental protection laws.
Due to self-selection or their experience on other committees prima-
rily concerned with budgetary limitations, members named to appro-
priations committees are likely to be especially sensitive to economic
costs.  For that reason, they are likely to be disproportionately con-
cerned with the more immediate and known economic costs of envi-
ronmental controls than they are responsive to the more speculative,
uncertain, long-term benefits of those same controls.  Accordingly,
they are prone to inserting appropriations riders that preclude the
meaningful implementation of previously enacted legislation that they
dislike.
Nor is such a structure merely a matter of theoretical speculation.
Just such an appropriations-process-driven dynamic has overridden
environmental lawmaking in the federal arena for almost twenty years.
Congress essentially passes no sweeping, comprehensive lawmaking
through its authorization committees, which is one reason why it has
proven so hard to enact climate change legislation.  The congres-
sional committees that have been the most active in actual environ-
mental lawmaking have been the appropriations committees and their
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subcommittees.  Members of those committees have perfected to a
high art the inclusion of appropriations riders in bills and earmarks in
accompanying legislative reports that seek to micromanage environ-
mental lawmaking in the Executive Branch on behalf of narrow, short-
term economic interests to which members of those committees tend
to be especially responsive.96
A similar division of interests is evident within the Executive
Branch.  Although certain agencies, primarily the EPA, have defining
missions that render them especially sensitive to environmental pro-
tection concerns, the same is not necessarily so for many other power-
ful forces within that branch.  The Departments of the Interior,
Agriculture (including the Forest Service), and Commerce (including
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration) each have
mixed missions—they both enforce certain restrictions and, because
of their own resource management activities, are subject to others.  As
a result, a single agency often includes offices (such as the Fish and
Wildlife Service and the Bureau of Land Management at the Depart-
ment of the Interior) with sharply contrasting policy outlooks.  Other
very powerful cabinet agencies, such as the Departments of Transpor-
tation, Energy, and Defense, are mostly the targets of environmental
regulation and therefore are more likely to be skeptical of tough re-
strictions that cabin their discretionary authority to pursue their pri-
mary agendas.  And, of course, the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) within the Executive Office of the President is, at least histori-
cally, systematically focused on the near-term economic outlook and
its budgetary implications.
The result is a disjunction of sorts within the federal Executive
Branch.  The federal Executive Branch is simultaneously the regulator
and the regulated.  Some portions of the Branch take an expansive,
supportive view of environmental protection law, while other parts
embrace a narrower, more skeptical outlook.  The highly uncertain
nature of ecological cause and effect and its complexity provide much
fodder for disagreement, which both informs and slows down the law-
making process.97
The peculiar political systems that have developed around gov-
ernment in the United States, especially surrounding the election of
the President, members of Congress, and many state and local offi-
cials, provide another source of obstacles for environmental law.  The
most obvious of these obstacles is the extent to which those running
for office are dependent on campaign donations from those with con-
siderable economic resources.  Clearly, because of its inherently redis-
96 I have written at length on this shift in the dynamic of environmental lawmaking in
Lazarus, supra note 4. R
97 See supra Part I.A.
\\server05\productn\C\CRN\94-5\CRN503.txt unknown Seq: 31  7-JUL-09 12:15
2009] SUPER WICKED PROBLEMS AND CLIMATE CHANGE 1183
tributive nature, environmental protection law tends to be most
threatening to those who currently have many economic resources.
Such persons and entities tend, notwithstanding some notable excep-
tions, to be understandably opposed to laws that would reduce their
existing wealth and corresponding economic clout.  As a result, those
advocating environmental protection laws typically face well-funded
opposition.
At the same time, those persons and entities favoring stronger
environmental protection laws (that is, environmentalists) are likely to
face severe organizational barriers to mounting effective political cam-
paigns.  To the extent that environmentalists are dominated by those
currently “losing” under the existing system of laws, they are likely to
have far fewer economic resources.  Furthermore, as environmentalist
interests are not always economic in character but are instead often
based on a moral vision regarding the proper relationship between
humankind and the natural environment, environmentalists are espe-
cially unlikely to be able to enlist allies from the business community
to convert their vision into the campaign coffers needed for political
success.
Moreover, the tremendous spatial and temporal dimensions asso-
ciated with ecological injury create tremendous impediments to effec-
tive political organization in favor of environmental protection.  The
pool of those adversely affected is simply too spread out over space
and time to effectively organize for collective action.  Future victims
do not yet know of the damage; for one thing, they might not yet be
born.  Present victims are unlikely to understand the source of their
suffering given the extraordinary complexity of the natural environ-
ment and the associated scientific uncertainty.  Present victims who
are aware of the source of their suffering may also take no action due
to the perverse incentives generated by the prospects of “free riders,”
who exploit the ecosystem commons to maximize their gains or mini-
mize their losses by relying on others to make the necessary sacrifices.
Perhaps for these reasons, those seeking elected office tend to
stress the importance of economic growth and promise short-term re-
sults: new businesses, new jobs, lower taxes, and a broader tax base to
support desired government services.  These short-term results tend to
be the catchwords and slogans of those seeking elected office in rela-
tively short electoral cycles (typically two or four years), especially at
the state and local levels.  A candidate seeking elected office based on
an environmental agenda that is not premised on traditional notions
of economic growth but instead on the imposition of short-term limits
with the prospect of widely dispersed gain in the distant future is sub-
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stantially disadvantaged within the political system.98  Whatever short-
sightedness individuals have because of their basic morality, their
worldview is far longer than that of the typical politician seeking
reelection.99
Finally, our political system is inherently dependent on bargain-
ing and the forging of compromises.  The ability to compromise com-
peting interests and thereby eliminate conflict is often the calling card
of a successful politician or government official.  For environmental
protection, however, compromise is not always a viable option.  In
some settings, undertaking a series of compromises simply delays the
ultimate destruction of the resource of concern.  Effective environ-
mental protection might require long-term adherence to absolute lim-
its, not provisional objectives to be inexorably bartered away over
time.  Yet the economic pressures on the environment are constant
and unrelenting, and such nonnegotiable environmental regulation
rarely occurs.  That is because coalitions are formed on the basis of
short-term goals, and even a strong coalition of environmentalists can
quickly be broken down by appeals to their differing interests over the
longer term.100
2. The Making of Climate Change Law in Particular
Based on the preceding analysis, climate change law is no less
than environmental lawmaking’s worst nightmare, which is also why it
warrants the “super wicked” label.  By fragmenting lawmaking author-
ity and relying on short-term election cycles, we make it almost impos-
sible to form the political coalitions necessary to address long-term
issues.101  The combination of the science of climate change and
human nature perversely triggers obstacle after obstacle.
98 See Alan M. Jacobs, Democracy, Public Policy, and Timing: Toward A Theory of
Intertemporal Policy Choice 9 (June 3, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with au-
thor), available at http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2004/Jacobs.pdf (describing how, for
elected officials, the “when” of the distribution of costs and benefits associated with a pro-
posed public policy is crucial and they naturally favor proposals with quick positive
returns).
99 See Lagerspetz, supra note 69, at 159–60; William Leblanc et al., Majority-Rule Bar- R
gaining and the Under Provision of Public Investment Goods, 75 J. PUB. ECON. 21, 21–47 (2000)
(explaining that because individuals favor short-term returns, politicians seeking to maxi-
mize votes do so even more, which leads to underinvestment in the future and overutiliza-
tion of natural resources).
100 See Alan M. Jacobs, Ties that Bind: Institutions, Uncertainty, and Politics of Long-
Term Constraint 10–11 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available at http://
faculty.arts.ubc.ca/Jacobs/Jacobs%20Constraints%20Paper%20-%20Workshop.pdf
(describing the shifting nature of political coalitions and how they tend to be organized
around short-term concerns that are ineffective at maintaining longer term political
agendas).
101 Id. at 10 (“[I]nstitutional fragmentation . . . renders potential long-term commit-
ment mechanisms largely inoperative.”); see Pierrehumbert, supra note 17, at 593 (“Solving R
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First, climate change’s enormous temporal and distributional
dimensions undermine the building of a powerful political coalition
capable of long-term sustainability.  The people most in immediate
need of climate change law are not even at the lawmaking table here
in the United States.  They are the very poor in far-removed parts of
the globe and members of future generations, whether in the United
States or elsewhere, so temporally distant as to be essentially
unimaginable as actual human lives.  And even those who are physi-
cally available and concerned enough about climate change to sup-
port legislative action are typically bound together largely by short-
term and narrowly focused interests that serve as a tenuous basis for
long-term advocacy.
Second, by contrast, the entities skeptical of and opposed or even
hostile to any such lawmaking will be extremely well represented and
will also likely be supported by substantial political and economic
power.  They will include those powerful business interests that be-
lieve they have the most to lose, at least in the short term, from any
significant restrictions on current economic activity for the purpose of
reducing greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere.  They are
economic interests that have settled investment-backed expectations
in maintenance of the status quo and for which a long-term invest-
ment might have a five-, ten-, or perhaps even a twenty-year time hori-
zon, but nothing approaching the temporal reach of climate change.
They will also include many elected officials.  Their constituents are
concerned mostly with short-term, not long-term, factors, reflecting
shades of Bill Clinton’s celebrated campaign slogan in 1992: “It’s the
economy, stupid.”  But even apart from the constituents who actually
cast ballots, elected officials are responsive to the priorities of power-
ful economic players who fund their political campaigns.102
The potential for short-term benefits from climate change in na-
tions like the United States will fuel other climate change lawmaking
skeptics.  Those who believe they have something to gain, whether
from predictions of enhanced agricultural productivity or access to
new energy resources, will be naturally reluctant to join a coalition
favoring climate change legislation.
Third, it is not just the causes of climate change that are marked
by distributional disparities; the same is true for the costs of reducing
greenhouse gas emissions.  Some parts of the United States, some in-
the problem of global warming demands a long-term focus that is not a natural match for
the way political institutions operate.”).
102 See Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 841, 875 (2006)
(stating that politicians will delay implementing environmental precautions if costs “will be
incurred immediately, and if the benefits will not be enjoyed for many decades . . . . [be-
cause] they will face political retribution for imposing immediate costs and might well
receive little or no political gain for delivering long-term benefits”).
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dustries, and some activities will be more adversely affected than
others.  This is true whether the emissions abatement is achieved by
emissions allowances, carbon taxes, or technology-based emissions re-
duction requirements.  Although
the net cost of achieving [significant] levels of GHG abatement
could be quite low on a societal basis, issues of timing and allocation
would likely lead various stakeholders to perceive the costs very dif-
ferently—particularly during the transition to a lower carbon econ-
omy.  Costs will tend to concentrate more in some sectors than
others . . . .103
Those who perceive that they are on the losing end of these disparities
will invariably be able to create obstacles to implementation by taking
advantage of the multiple opportunities provided in our fragmented
lawmaking system.104
Fourth, joining the skeptics will be those concerned about devel-
oping nations, especially China, outpacing the United States economi-
cally if we were to diminish our economic activity to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions.  Even worse, any possible positive environ-
mental impact from our emissions reductions would be quickly over-
whelmed by emissions increases from sources in those other nations.
Accordingly, these skeptics will be reluctant to agree to any significant
emissions reduction absent enforceable commitments from nations
like China to do the same.
Nor is it so easy to suppose that a grassroots movement can be
maintained over the long term as necessary to overcome the powerful
economic and political forces skeptical of climate change lawmaking.
Instead, as explained above, human nature, or more specifically, limits
on human cognition, suggest just the opposite.  People will generally
not perceive the consequences of their actions today in distant lands
and unimaginably distant times.  The consequences of activities that
promote greenhouse gas emissions today are too unavailable and too
103 JON CREYTS ET AL., REDUCING U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS: HOW MUCH AT
WHAT COST?, at ix (McKinsey & Co., Dec. 2007).
104 See J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: The Case of
Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1499, 1546–50 (2007) (describing contrasting incentives
of various types of industries regarding the structure of climate change legislation).  Repre-
sentative John Dingell’s effort on behalf of the auto industry to prevent passage of more
demanding fuel efficiency standards is emblematic of the program of such factionalization
and its potentially paralyzing effect on meaningful climate change legislation.  Although
Representative Dingell generally expresses support of climate change legislation, he has
frequently remained a stumbling block to efforts to include in such legislation tougher fuel
efficiency standards that the auto industry in his congressional district oppose, notwith-
standing the critical role such standards must play in reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
See, e.g., John M. Broder, Hopes Dim for Measures to Conserve Energy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13,
2007, at A16 (“The mileage standard appears just in the Senate bill, having been squelched
in the House by the opposition of Representative John D. Dingell, the powerful Democrat
from Michigan.”).
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unrepresentative of those activities to allow for the sustainable politi-
cal movement necessary for sustained climate change lawmaking.
II
CLIMATE CHANGE’S LAWMAKING MOMENT AND THE
PROPRIETY OF PRECOMMITMENT STRATEGIES
Of course, the lawmaking obstacles just described explain not
only why Congress has failed to pass climate change legislation during
the past decade, but also why it will continue to be difficult for Con-
gress to do so within the next few years.  As described in more detail
below, there is nonetheless good reason to suppose that domestic
politics have recently shifted enough that such legislation may in fact
soon be achieved.105  It is therefore important now to consider how
best to include provisions within any such statute that are capable of
increasing the law’s ability to achieve its objectives over the long term
by limiting the ability of future legislators and officials to undermine
the statute’s implementation.  Concerns one might otherwise have
about the antidemocratic effects of such lawmaking restraints should
be reduced by the need for just those kinds of restraints to preserve
options for future generations.
Finally, changes in the institutional design of lawmaking related
to federal climate change law are also the most promising basis for
overcoming the features of the climate change problem that make it
so wickedly resistant to legal redress.  Three ingredients—the science
of climate change, human nature, and the nature of our lawmaking
institutions—have led to the current logjam precluding effective cli-
mate change legislation.106  Those same three ingredients will con-
tinue to impede the long-term implementation of such legislation
once it is finally enacted.  Of the three, moreover, only one is suscepti-
ble to meaningful change in the first instance, and that is the institu-
tional design of lawmaking institutions.107  The science of climate
change is a fixed factor.  It cannot be redefined away.  To be sure, as
testified to by recent events, some politicians may seek to fictionalize
or even literally to rewrite science to match their preferred policy
views.  Such politicians pretend that the evidence of climate change is
more equivocal than scientific consensus now accepts.108  Ignoring ac-
105 See infra Part II.A.
106 See supra Parts I.A–C.
107 STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULA-
TION 55 (1993) (describing how, because neither human nature nor congressional politics
is susceptible to ready change, it is best to focus instead on institutional reform).
108 See Robert F. Rich & Kelly R. Merrick, Use and Misuse of Science: Global Climate Change
and the Bush Administration, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 223, 231 (2007) (discussing the Bush
Administration’s use and misuse of climate change science, in particular its efforts to “limit
media access to a leading scientist and . . . edit[ ] . . . scientists’ work”); Andrew C. Revkin,
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tual science, however, is not a basis for addressing climate change but
just for further procrastination.
Nor can we safely rely on human nature transforming on its own.
Here too, we are who we are, including our limited time horizons,
consumptive biases, and susceptibility to certain cognitive errors in
judgment.  As the Framers understood in crafting the Constitution, it
is foolhardy to enact laws based on assumptions of who we ought to be
rather than who we in fact are.109  Of course, utility curves may shift
and different societies can embrace very different cultural attitudes
toward resource consumption and shared communities.  And perhaps
over the longer term, even societies like our own here in the United
States may change and embrace lifestyles far less focused on the pre-
sent and more sensitive to the needs of future generations.  Private
preferences are not static and can change significantly over time.  In-
formation disclosure laws and other techniques aimed directly at indi-
vidual behavior responsible for unnecessary greenhouse gas emissions
no doubt can effectively “nudge” people to embrace lifestyles that
have much smaller carbon footprints.110
But these kinds of changes in private preferences are most likely
to be driven by law.111  Significant funds for public education and in-
Climate Change Testimony Was Edited by White House, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2007, at A16
(describing the Office of Management and Budget’s editing of the written testimony of the
director of Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, which was submitted to the Envi-
ronment and Public Works Committee, as “‘a misuse of science and abuse of the legislative
process’”) (quoting Dr. Michael McCally); Daniel Smith, Political Science, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
4, 2005, § 6 (Magazine), at 36 (noting that American scientists are concerned that “‘scien-
tific conclusions, reached either within agencies or by people outside of government, are
being changed for political reasons by people who have not done the scientific work’”)
(quoting Donald Kennedy).
109 See infra notes 159–62 and accompanying text; see also Joffe, supra note 80, at 97 R
(“To improve the world, one must work with human nature as it is and not assume it
away.”).
110 See Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 193–96 (2008) (“What if a way could be found to ensure
that people see, each day, how much energy they have used. . . .  [I]f we can find ways to
make energy use visible, we’ll nudge people toward reducing their energy use without
mandating any such reductions.”); Dernbach, supra note 88, at 144–56 (describing possible R
information disclosure and other programs directed to individual behavior); Vandenbergh
& Steinemann, supra note 86, at 1729–34 (describing individual carbon release inventories, R
information disclosure on related climate change impacts, and a carbon neutral registry).
111 Legislation relating to seatbelts is illustrative.  Mandatory seatbelt legislation is a
classic precommitment strategy, and a seatbelt itself epitomizes an anticipatory restraint.
Individuals lacked the judgment necessary to use seatbelts.  Mandatory seatbelt use over-
came that obstacle and eventually caused such a major shift in human behavior that for
most people, any notion that this legal mandate is burdening them or constraining their
liberty has long since dissipated.  Private preferences have shifted in response to the legal
mandate. See Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy, in CONSTITU-
TIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND SOCIAL CHANGE 195, 236 n.125
(Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988).  Similarly, low-hanging fruit exists for shifting
private preferences and lifestyles in ways that can significantly reduce greenhouse gas emis-
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formation disclosure will certainly be an important component of cli-
mate change legislation designed to promote just such a shift in
public preferences and lifestyle choices.  However, the time frame for
action required by the science of climate change does not provide us
with the freedom to rely on public education to achieve the significant
changes necessary immediately.  The cost of further delay in reducing
greenhouse gas emissions is too great.
A. The Prospects of Federal Climate Change Legislation
Notwithstanding the lawmaking hurdles that have precluded en-
actment of federal climate change legislation to date, the time now
seems ripe for its passage.  For the first time, both the President and
congressional leaders in both chambers support passage of significant
climate change law.  Indeed, never before has the occupant of the
White House made passage of such legislation a primary part of his
campaign for the Oval Office.  President Barack Obama repeatedly
stressed his support of significant climate change legislation during
his campaign,112 even referring to the urgency of addressing the cli-
mate change issue the night of his election,113 appointed a “Climate
Czar” in the White House to champion the issue,114 and, within the
first week of office, issued a memorandum to the EPA directing the
Agency to revisit policy decisions made by the prior Administration
that had hindered implementation of climate change law.115
Events outside the United States also significantly increase the
likelihood of congressional action.  The IPCC 2007 Report has re-
sions with little or no impact on human enjoyment. See Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra
note 86, at 1699–1700. R
112 See Obama for America, Barack Obama and Joe Biden: New Energy for America,
http://www.barackobama.com/pdf/factsheet_energy_speech_080308.pdf (last visited Apr.
5, 2009) (proposing an 80 percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2050).
113 See Barack Obama, Address After Winning the Presidential Election (excerpt), in
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2008, at P5 (presenting excerpts from a speech by President-elect Ba-
rack Obama, who referred to “a planet in peril”).
114 John M. Broder, Title, but Unclear Power, for a New Climate Czar, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12,
2008, at A28 (reporting that President Obama named Carol Browner Assistant to the Presi-
dent for Energy and Climate Change).
115 John M. Broder & Peter Baker, Obama’s Order Likely to Tighten Auto Standards: Signal-
ing Policy Shift; California Leads Effort to Cut Emissions and Raise Efficiency, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26,
2009, at A1 (announcing presidential memorandum to the EPA, directing the EPA to re-
consider prior Administration’s denial of California’s application to regulate greenhouse
gas emissions from new motor vehicles).  On April 17, 2009, pursuant to the Clean Air Act,
EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson signed formal proposed findings that emissions of green-
house gas emissions threaten public health and welfare and that combined emissions of
such gases from new motor vehicles and motor vehicle engines combine and contribute to
climate change. See Proposed Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Green-
house Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, (pre-publication copy, Apr. 17,
2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.), available at http://epa.gov/climatechange/endanger-
ment/downloads/GHGEndangermentProposal.pdf.
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moved any serious doubt from the political arena whether both signif-
icant reduction in greenhouse gas emissions from human activities
and concrete plans to adapt to climate change are now necessary.
The long-awaited, and much-debated, scientific consensus regarding
climate change cause and effect is now at hand.116
No less important, the pressure from other nations on the United
States to act as a leader in addressing climate change is mounting to a
degree that can no longer be easily ignored.  Other nations, especially
nations in the European Union, have begun to address the issue to a
far greater extent than the United States has.  However, the terms of
their engagement are frequently directly linked to whether the United
States will also take action.117
But the pressure will not just arise from other developed nations
that, like the United States, have historically contributed to green-
house gas concentrations, albeit not to the same degree as the United
States.  The political pressure will also be produced by events in the
world’s poorer nations, as they begin to suffer more visibly within
their own borders and export climate change’s harmful impacts on
human health and welfare.118  Wholly apart from whatever moral obli-
gation U.S. citizens may feel to address suffering abroad caused by
wasteful energy consumption within our own borders, the national se-
curity implications to the United States from the resulting destabiliza-
tion of populations and governments are undeniably serious.119  That
has long been true in theory.120  In the next few years, however, some
of that theory will no longer be merely theoretical.
116 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. R
117 See, e.g., Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on
the Effort of Member States to Reduce Their Greenhouse Gas Emissions to Meet the Com-
munity’s Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction Commitments up to 2020, COM (2008) 17
Final, at 4, 6 (2008) (on file with author) (proposing that the European Union commit to
30 percent greenhouse gas emissions reduction by 2020 as compared to 1990, but take no
further steps toward the goal of 50 percent reduction by 2050 until other developed coun-
tries agree to comparable emissions reductions).
118 THE CNA CORP., NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE THREAT OF CLIMATE CHANGE 6
(2008), available at http://www.SecurityAndClimate.cna.org (“Economic and environmen-
tal conditions in already fragile areas will further erode as food production declines, dis-
eases increase, clean water becomes increasingly scarce, and large populations move in
search of resources.”).
119 See KURT M. CAMPBELL ET AL., THE AGE OF CONSEQUENCES: THE FOREIGN POLICY AND
NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 20–21 (2007) (describing
climate change as “just as dangerous—and more intractable—than the arms race between
the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War”) (quoting Thomas Homer-
Dixon, Terror in the Weather Forecast, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2007); THE CNA CORP., supra note
118, at 1 (“The nature and pace of climate changes being observed today and the conse- R
quences projected by the consensus scientific opinion are grave and pose equally grave
implications for our national security.”).
120 See Jessica Tuchman Mathews, Redefining Security, 68 FOREIGN AFF. 162, 162 (1989)
(suggesting in 1989 that “[g]lobal developments now suggest the need for another analo-
gous, broadening definition of national security to include resource, environmental and
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There will also likely be increased domestic political pressure for
federal climate change legislation, and not just from environmental-
ists.  As states increasingly act to fill the gap left by Congress, business
interests will increasingly favor a national approach.  Large businesses
that operate in many states will far prefer one set of rules established
at the national level, even if quite stringent, over an array of differing
standards established by fifty state sovereigns.121  Those businesses will
no doubt make inclusion of some federal preemption rules a condi-
tion of their support for any federal legislation.  Nonetheless, their
desire for federal legislation of any kind will increase the odds of con-
gressional enactment, whether or not the legislation passed ultimately
includes the kind of sweeping preemption businesses may have
wanted.122
Moreover, businesses seeking to avoid state climate change regu-
lation will not be the only ones to favor federal legislation.  Many of
the larger businesses that operate in other countries and find them-
selves subject to climate change regulation elsewhere may favor legis-
lation in the United States.  For instance, they may wish to guard
against possible competitive disadvantages that might otherwise exist.
In addition, many businesses are likely to perceive economic opportu-
nity in federal climate change legislation.123  Federal legislation offers
the prospect of substantial economic sweeteners, such as the buying
and selling of tradable emission allowances or subsidies for the devel-
opment of more efficient appliances or alternative energy supplies,124
which some sectors of the economy hope to exploit to their
advantage.125
demographic issues,” given that “[e]nvironmental strains . . . are . . . beginning to break
down the sacred boundaries of national sovereignty”).
121 DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 104, at 1530–31, 1533–38; see E. Donald Elliott et R
al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 313, 326 (1985) (describing how desire for federal preemption of state regulation
of motor vehicles prompted the auto industry to support federal legislation).
122 See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 104, at 1530–31, 1536 (“[I]ndustry demand is R
solely responsible for federal regulation, but [a multiplicity of] state regulation can prompt
industry players to support a federal policy response sooner than they otherwise might
have, increasing the likelihood of its passage.”).
123 FRED KRUPP & MIRIAM HORN, EARTH: THE SEQUEL: THE RACE TO REINVENT ENERGY
AND STOP GLOBAL WARMING 9–13, 250–52 (2008) (describing how the institution of a cap-
and-trade system for carbon dioxide would provide innovators with billions of dollars that
would “mobilize virtually every realm of economic activity”).
124 See id. (“Only when legislators make it a regulatory certainty that global warming
pollution will be limited will U.S. companies invest seriously in solar, biofuels, wave energy,
and clean cars.”).
125 See Juliet Eilperin, 150 Global Firms Seek Mandatory Cuts in Greenhouse Gas Emissions,
WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 2007, at A3 (describing how some of the world’s largest businesses,
including Coca-Cola, General Electric, Shell, DuPont, Nike, and Johnson & Johnson, sup-
port a “legally binding agreement [that] ‘will provide business with the certainty it needs to
scale up global investment in low-carbon technologies’”).
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Finally, it is increasingly clear that there is a significant amount of
“low-hanging fruit” that will allow people and businesses in the United
States to significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions without the
kind of severe economic disruption some have prophesized.126  One
of the advantages of existing energy practices that are absurdly waste-
ful is that tremendous efficiencies can be readily achieved by curbing
those practices.127  According to a recent widely acclaimed study
jointly commissioned by leading industries and environmental organi-
zations, the United States already possesses the technological capacity
to curtail significantly our greenhouse gas emissions without ruining
our economy or making enormous lifestyle sacrifices.128  This is true
for business, but is also true for individuals, whose energy-wasteful
lifestyles contribute more to greenhouse gas emissions than many of
the nation’s largest industries.129  By adopting readily available energy
conservation measures, individuals could reduce their greenhouse gas
emissions by as much as 60 percent.130  Although the cost of achieving
greenhouse gas reductions will rise substantially after the first series of
wasteful behaviors are easily eliminated, those initially lower costs
should make it politically easier to secure a law’s passage.131  This is
one instance in which a short-term political advantage may exist for
climate change legislation of human nature’s myopic tendencies.
For all these reasons, the prospects seem not only better than
they have ever been but even fairly good that the longstanding legisla-
tive logjam will finally be broken and federal climate change legisla-
126 See Michael P. Vandenbergh et al., Individual Carbon Emissions: The Low-Hanging
Fruit, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1705–09 (2008) (describing a “low-hanging fruit” strategy, in
which legislators could try to achieve large reductions at lower costs).
127 See Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 86, at 1699–1703. R
128 In a report prepared by McKinsey and Company in association with DTE Energy,
Environmental Defense Fund, Honeywell, National Grid, Natural Resources Defense
Council, Pacific Gas & Electric, and Shell, the authors noted as their central conclusion:
The United States could reduce greenhouse gas emissions in 2030 by 3.0 to
4.5 gigatons of [carbon dioxide equivalent] using tested approaches and
high potential emerging technologies.  These reductions would involve
pursuing a wide array of abatement options available at marginal costs less
than $50 per ton, with the average net cost to the economy being far lower
if the nation can capture sizable gains from energy efficiency.  Achieving
these reductions at the lowest cost to the economy, however, will require
strong, coordinated, economy-wide action that begins in the near future.
CREYTS ET AL., supra note 103, at ix (citation omitted); see also S. Pacala & R. Socolow, R
Stabilization Wedges: Solving the Climate Problem for the Next 50 Years with Current Technologies,
305 SCIENCE 968–72 (2004) (“Humanity already possesses the fundamental, scientific, tech-
nical, and industrial know-how to solve the carbon and climate problem for the next half-
century.”).
129 Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 86, at 1694. R
130 Id. at 1700.
131 See Vandenbergh et al., supra note 126, at 1701, 1705–09 (describing how a “low- R
hanging fruit” strategy could achieve large reductions at lower costs and which could also
facilitate a shift of public support for more aggressive regulation in the future).
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tion will be enacted within the next four years.  But passage of climate
change legislation is one thing, while successful implementation over
the decades necessary to achieve its ambitious goals is quite another.
And no sooner than the ink dries on the bill signed into law by the
President will the same political and economic forces that long re-
sisted the legislation try to undermine the new law’s implementation,
especially as costs invariably rise.
B. The Propriety of Lawmaking Restraints in Federal Climate
Change Legislation
What is largely missing from existing scholarship is direct atten-
tion to the question of how to ensure the maintenance of the neces-
sary climate change legislation over time.  To a certain extent, this
inquiry is related to the question concerning the right mix of controls
to be adopted in the first instance.  Some types of controls are likely to
have more staying power than others, either because they are less eco-
nomically disruptive or otherwise more politically palatable.  It would
clearly be wise to favor some types of controls over others for that
reason.  Yet consideration of this relevant factor is no substitute for
the exclusive focus of this Article’s endeavor, which is to anticipate the
challenges that climate change law will face and structure the entire
program for its long-term success no matter which mix of controls the
legislation includes.132
As I see it, one of the most significant lawmaking challenges we
now face is to exploit the upcoming lawmaking moment to create cli-
mate change laws that are not just momentary.  The requirements of
federal climate change legislation have to be steadfast or “sticky” in
some respects and flexible in others, which is no small feat.  The legis-
132 Accordingly, it is not the purpose of this Article to enter directly the debate con-
cerning the optimal mix of controls to achieve the necessary reductions and relief mea-
sures.  That is, of course, the issue that dominates almost all of the current policy and
lawmaking debates.  Which sectors of the economy should be covered by the legislation:
electric utilities, mining, transportation, major industry, and agriculture?  Should the dom-
inant regulatory tool be a carbon tax and, if so, how much should it be?  Or should it be a
scheme for tradable emissions akin to that utilized in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments
for acid deposition?  And, if so, how should such allowances be allocated?  Based on past
emissions?  Or by auction?  Or should the primary regulatory mechanism for achieving
greenhouse gas emissions reduction be technology-based standards, as in the Clean Water
Act?  If so, to what extent should cost be considered in the determination of such stan-
dards, and under what deadlines must they be promulgated and subject to enforcement?
These are just a very few of hundreds of first-order policy questions with which lawmakers
will need to grapple and answer to craft effective climate change legislation in the near
future. See, e.g., Victor B. Flatt, Taking the Legislative Temperature: Which Federal Climate
Change Legislative Proposal is “Best”?, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 123, 139–40 (2007) (noting that in
crafting climate change legislation, legislators must address several policy choices).  These
are all clearly important questions, especially given that many address the short-term distri-
butional consequences upon which regulated industry most immediately focuses.
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lation must be sufficiently steadfast to resist, over the longer term, the
constant barrage of pressures launched by economically and politi-
cally powerful interests seeking to delay and relax the law’s proscrip-
tions for their own short-term gain.  But it would be no less of a
mistake for the law to be wholly inflexible and not subject to revision.
Precisely because the effectiveness of any climate change law depends
on its success over the long term, the law must admit the possibility of
significant legislative or regulatory change in light of new information
and changing circumstances.
The solution to this lawmaking conundrum is the careful use of
asymmetric lawmaking processes designed to make some kind of fu-
ture lawmaking extremely hard to accomplish and other kinds much
easier.  Asymmetry will overcome the skewing that otherwise exists in
our lawmaking fora that favors those with short-term interests over
those with long-term interests and those outside the formal jurisdic-
tional bounds of the relevant lawmaking entity, yet subject to their
laws.  Anticipatory measures that change the design of normal law-
making processes can make it harder for those naturally more power-
ful to secure the change in law they seek and also make it easier for
those naturally less powerful to safeguard their competing interests,
including by securing the change in law that they believe is necessary.
The obvious objection to any such deliberate modifications of
lawmaking processes, especially those that make future lawmaking
more difficult, is that they are antidemocratic.  These modifications
allow the views of existing majorities to trump the views of future ma-
jorities who may well view sound public policy very differently.133  The
present generation always tends to believe that it may well be wiser
than those generations who came before them or those who will come
after them, and the risk is too great that allowing such restraints on
future lawmaking will allow the present, in its own self-interest, to con-
trol the future.134  The shorthand reference to this objection, of
course, is that the dead hand of the past or present should not be able
to govern the future.
There are, however, at least three compelling reasons for why the
dead hand concern is not persuasive as applied to the need for sub-
stantial lawmaking restraints in federal climate change legislation.
The first is that such restraints, notwithstanding their seemingly anti-
democratic implications, have a long and widely accepted history in
domestic law, ranging from the Constitution’s organization of the
House and the Senate to a host of existing federal statutes that seek to
insulate somewhat certain decisions from politics.135  Hence, such re-
133 See infra notes 145–49 and accompanying text.
134 See id.
135 See infra Part II.B.1.
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straints, rather than suggest a departure from the nation’s lawmaking
traditions, at the very least fall well within them.  Second, the lawmak-
ing restraints in federal climate change legislation would be deliber-
ately asymmetric in order to further the options available to future
generations, not restrict them.  Skewing currently exists in lawmaking
in general and certain interest groups exercise undue influence at the
expense of others.136  The institutional lawmaking design features
contemplated for federal climate legislation would be designed to re-
dress that existing skewing and therefore ultimately foster and not un-
dermine the fundamental values underlying representative
government.
The final justification relates to the sheer impracticalities of fail-
ing to address over the longer term the threats that climate change
now poses.  Preserving the ability of future majorities to retain the full
range of options necessary for self-government most likely depends on
climate change legislation capable of maintaining greenhouse gas
emissions reductions over the longer term.137  Otherwise, current
lawmakers will undercut the autonomy of future majorities by subject-
ing them to a natural environment that sharply curtails their options.
In other words, cross-temporal majority effects will occur with or with-
out climate change legislation.  The question is not whether to have
such cross-temporal impacts, but which ones to have.  To the extent,
therefore, that lawmaking restraints are a necessary component of cli-
mate change legislation that can provide future majorities with
greater opportunities, they further rather than undermine democratic
norms.
I discuss each of these three justifications in greater detail below.
1. A Longstanding Tradition of Precommitment Strategies to Restrain
Future Lawmaking
Lawmaking restraints in response to some kinds of especially
challenging lawmaking problems are a well-established feature of law-
making.  Political scientists, philosophers, scientists, and economists
refer to such self-imposed restraints on future behavior as “precom-
mitment” strategies.138  Precommitment strategies are techniques we
all use in our day-to-day lives to reinforce certain behavior or even
136 See id.
137 See Pierrehumbert, supra note 17, at 573 (“Humans have become a major geologi- R
cal force with the power to commit future millennia to practically irreversible changes in
global conditions.”); discussion infra Part II.B.1.
138 See Samuel Freeman, Reason and Agreement in Social Contract Views, 19 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 122, 143 (1990); Thomas C. Schelling, Enforcing Rules on Oneself, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
357, 363–64 (1985); R.H. Strotz, Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization, 23
REV. ECON. STUD. 165, 165, 173 (1955); Richard H. Thaler & H. M. Shefrin, An Economic
Theory of Self-Control, 89 J. POL. ECON. 392, 396–97 (1981).
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deliberately to limit our options: placing an alarm clock the night
before on the other side of the room;139 having a friend count our
calories or cigarettes;140 prepaying an annual health club member-
ship;141 holding a formal wedding ceremony to announce one’s com-
mitment in marriage before one’s family and community; or even, in
warfare, literally burning the bridge behind one’s troops to be assured
that retreat is not an option.142
One of the most famous precommitment strategies was that of
Ulysses in The Odyssey.143  Ulysses’ challenge was to avoid the ill fate
that befell those who succumbed to the seductive voices of the Sirens.
The goddess Circe crafted, in effect, a precommitment strategy that
would allow Ulysses to hear the Sirens yet not become their victim.
Circe instructed Ulysses to have the men on his ship fill their ears with
wax, tie Ulysses tightly to the mast, and then refuse to release him as
he listened to the Sirens’ song no matter how earnest his pleas to be
unbound.144
Nor did the possible role of precommitment strategies escape the
attention of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century political philosophers
debating how best to craft a representative democracy.  Many con-
demned the notion as fundamentally antidemocratic and foolish. Jean
Jacques Rousseau proclaimed, “Il est absurde´ que la volonte´ se donne
des chaines pour l’avenir . . . .” (It is absurd for the will to lay itself
under any restraint regarding the future).145  Adam Smith similarly
declared that “The earth and the fullness of it belongs to every genera-
tion, and the preceding one can have no right to bind it up from
posterity.”146  Thomas Jefferson warned that “[t]he earth belongs to
the living, not to the dead”147 and “by the law of nature, one genera-
tion is to another as one independent nation to another.”148  The
nineteenth-century British political philosopher Thomas B. Macaulay
similarly challenged John Stuart Mills’s promotion of democracy as
the superior form of government.  Macaulay asserted that
139 Holmes, supra note 111, at 236. R
140 Id.
141 Schelling, supra note 138, at 369. R
142 Jon Elster, Don’t Burn Your Bridge Before You Come to It: Some Ambiguities and Complexi-
ties of Precommitment, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1751, 1761–63 (2003).
143 HOMER, THE ODYSSEY (Rodney Merrill trans., Univ. of Mich. Press 2002).
144 See id. at 238.
145 JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, A TREATISE ON THE SOCIAL COMPACT OR, THE PRINCIPLES OF
POLITICAL LAW bk. II, ch. 1 (London, 1795).
146 ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 468 (R.L. Meek, D.D. Raphael & P.G.
Stein eds., Clarendon Press 1978); see also id. at 69–70.
147 THE JEFFERSONIAN CYCLOPEDIA: A COMPREHENSIVE COLLECTION OF THE VIEWS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 219 (John P. Foley ed., 1900).
148 Id. at 376.
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[e]ven if we were to grant that [Mill] had found out the form of
government which is best for the majority of the people now living
on the face of the earth, . . . . [i]t would still be incumbent on Mr.
Mill to prove that the interest of every generation is identical with
the interest of all succeeding generations.149
These same debates were reflected in the early discussions sur-
rounding the terms and proper role of our own federal Constitution,
and they continue today.150  As Stephen Holmes argues, “[t]he basic
function of a constitution is to remove certain decisions from the dem-
ocratic process, that is, to tie the community’s hands.”151  The classic
justification for such a restraint is that “constitutions are chains im-
posed by Peter when sober on Peter when drunk.”152  The enactment
of a constitution is, at least in theory, a moment of reason passing
limits on anticipated moments of passion.  Democracy depends on
such constraints to survive; otherwise, moments of majoritarian pas-
sion would backlash against and potentially destroy democracy it-
self.153  Constitutionalism is therefore depicted as an effective means
of balancing man’s passions and the temptations of power.154
Humankind’s cognitive limitations, especially its tendency toward
myopia and susceptibility to let passion overcome reason, are a domi-
nant theme underlying the arguments of those favoring such constitu-
tional self-restraints.  According to Holmes, a “constitution is the
institutionalized cure for this chronic myopia . . . .”155  The state must
overcome the “short-sightedness of the individual citizen” and “adopt
a long-term perspective and take the responsibility for those decisions
that will produce benefits only in the long term.”156  Cass Sunstein has
analogously explained how government may try to interfere with pri-
vate preferences if they result from “motivational distortions that char-
acterize addictions, habits, and myopic behavior.”157
149 Lagerspetz, supra note 69, at 160 (quoting T.B. Macaulay, Mill on Government (March R
1829), in JAMES MILL, POLITICAL WRITINGS, 271, 294–95 (Terence Ball ed., 1992)).
150 See Holmes, supra note 111, at 201–03. R
151 Id. at 196.
152 Elster, supra note 142, at 1765 (citing JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY R
OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 130 (2001)).
153 See Jon Elster, Introduction to CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 111, R
at 6.
154 See Francis Sejersted, Democracy and the Rule of Law: Some Historical Experiences of Con-
tradictions in the Striving for Good Government, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY, supra
note 111, at 131, 133.
155 Holmes, supra note 111, at 196. R
156 Lagerspetz, supra note 69, at 159. R
157 Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129,
1139 (1986).  Professor Sunstein, however, cautions against government too readily seek-
ing to correct its perception of such “cognitive errors.” Id. at 1166.  He contends that such
governmental efforts can amount to huge intrusions on individual liberty, and governmen-
tal action can itself be skewed by irrelevancies and rent-seeking perversions of the political
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The lawmaking structure and laws of the United States are rid-
dled with precommitment strategies, many of which are clearly in-
tended to anticipate likely errors in human judgment that might
otherwise lead to systematic errors in lawmaking.158  The Framers of
the U.S. Constitution sought for this very reason to limit majority law-
making power in significant respects.159  James Madison, for instance,
considered precommitment essential because the momentary circum-
stances then existing for altruistic lawmaking “created psychological
conditions for trust and cooperation” that were “unlikely to endure”
and Madison, accordingly, worried about instability over time.160
Madison “expressly embraced the notion that what would separate his
constitution from those that had gone before it would be a more real-
istic conception of human nature.”161  As the political scientist Martin
Diamond, in his comments on the political science embraced by the
Framers of our Constitution, observed: “[a]ncient and medieval
thought and practice were said to have failed disastrously by clinging
to illusions regarding how men ought to be.  Instead, the new science
would take man as he actually is.”162
Our constitutional system deliberately makes lawmaking difficult
for that very reason: to guard against potential overreaction to more
immediate impulses of the moment.163  Although fragmentation of
lawmaking authority poses obstacles to climate change legislation,
such fragmentation was designed, ironically, to prevent excessive law-
making by present generations that would effectively bind the future.
Thus, lawmaking authority is dispersed among the Legislative, Ex-
ecutive, and Judicial Branches and then further fragmented within
each of those branches.  The Legislative Branch is comprised of two
chambers to reduce the potential for impulsive lawmaking;164 that is
also why representatives within each chamber are elected for different
terms and from differing jurisdictional boundaries.165  The upper
process. Id. He also argues that present generations discounting the needs of the future
need not be considered irrational at all. See id. at 1168–69.
158 See Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 67, at  554, 589. R
159 See Elster, supra note 142, at 1758 n.21. R
160 Holmes, supra note 111, at 216. R
161 Jonathan R. Macey, Competing Economic Views of the Constitution, 56 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 50, 55 (1987).
162 Jonathan R. Macey, Cynicism and Trust in Politics and Constitutional Theory, 87 COR-
NELL L. REV. 280, 296 (2002) (quoting Daniel Patrick Moynihan, The “New Science of Politics”
and the Old Art of Government, 86 PUB. INT. 22, 23–24 (1987)).
163 See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison), Nos. 15, 51 (Alexander Hamilton);
Macey, supra note 162, at 296–99.  These protections can be seen as counteracting heuris- R
tics and other cognitive biases. See Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 77, at 639. R
164 Macey, supra note 162, at 298; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. R
165 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, 3.
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chamber’s longer and staggered terms “ameliorate the predictable op-
eration of the availability and representativeness heuristics.”166
As a further guard, the President is entitled to veto legislation,
and any veto can be overcome only by a supermajority of legislators in
both chambers.167  Lawmaking is also generally separated from law ex-
ecution, which guards against legislative excesses.168  The Constitution
provides that the President cannot serve more than two terms,169
partly in recognition of the tendency of voters to reelect incumbents
rather than risk an unknown.170  The Bill of Rights is likewise riddled
with limitations on democratic lawmaking designed to guard against
perceived human tendencies, for instance: “to withdraw certain sub-
jects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them be-
yond the reach of majorities;”171 to rush to judgment against the
criminally accused;172 to silence unpopular speech;173 to disrespect
minority religions;174 to impose cruel and unusual punishment on the
despised;175 and to diminish private property rights of the few in or-
der to promote the interests of the many.176
Finally, the Constitution promotes an independent judiciary.  Al-
though its members must be nominated by the President and con-
firmed by the Senate,177 the Chief and Associate Justices have life
tenure and are not subject to removal short of an impeachable of-
fense.178  Nor may the Legislature diminish their pay.179  The constitu-
tional message is clear: the Framers sought to remove the interpreters
of the law and the Constitution as much as possible from the hurly-
burly, short-term political pressures, and infighting often found in the
other two branches.  Thus, the Supreme Court does not weigh public
opinion when deciding difficult constitutional cases, such as whether
166 Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 77, at 639. R
167 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
168 See Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 77, at 640. R
169 U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, 1.
170 See Bruce G. Peabody & Scott E. Gant, The Twice and Future President: Constitutional
Interstices and the Twenty-Second Amendment, 83 MINN. L. REV. 565, 601 (1999); see also id. at
578 (quoting Thomas Jefferson saying “that his attachment to the principle of [presiden-
tial] rotation . . . was born out of a fear that ‘the indulgence and attachments of the people
will keep a man in the chair after he becomes a dotard, that re-election through life shall
become habitual, and election for life follow that’” (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson
to John Taylor, in THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 142 (Edward Dumbauld
ed., 1955))).
171 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
172 See U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI.
173 See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
174 See id.
175 See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
176 See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
177 U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2.
178 U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 1.
179 Id.
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a First Amendment right exists not to be subject to criminal punish-
ment for burning an American Flag.180
Early Supreme Court precedent commented on the Framers’ in-
tent in the Constitution to guard against the human tendency toward
myopia.  In Fletcher v. Peck,181 Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the
Court in 1810, emphasized “that the framers of the constitution
viewed, with some apprehension, the violent acts which might grow
out of the feelings of the moment.”182  The Constitution, accordingly,
sought to guard against or at least limit the harm that could be caused
by such moments of passion: “the people of the United States, in
adopting that instrument, have manifested a determination to shield
themselves and their property from the effects of those sudden and
strong passions to which men are exposed.”183
2. The Propriety of Using Precommitment Strategies to Overcome
Perceived Defects in Our Federal Lawmaking System
There is also significant historical precedent for modifying our
nation’s normal lawmaking system in response to perceived tenden-
cies of our particular form of representative democracy to achieve un-
sound results in addressing certain kinds of problems.184  One such
tendency, also implicated by climate change law, is the potential domi-
nation of lawmaking processes by those seeking to satisfy short-term,
more narrowly defined interests at the expense of longer-term
concerns.
For instance, Congress sometimes delegates lawmaking authority
to Executive Branch agencies to remove members of Congress from
especially difficult, politically controversial decisions that might upset
their constituents because of the decisions’ short-term and narrowly
focused consequences.185  Such delegation allows Congress, in effect,
to insulate itself from the influence of powerful interests that would
180 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 432–35 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring)
(stating that no matter how much flag burning offends, such an expression is protected
under the First Amendment and cannot be subject to criminal prosecution).
181 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
182 Id. at 137–38.
183 Id. at 138.
184 Of course, what constitutes “unsound” results often lies in the eye of the beholder.
Political science scholars have long written about the tendency of legislative majorities to
seek to entrench their policy preferences in legislation or rulemaking agencies that will
survive over time, including once they are no longer in the majority. See Terry M. Moe, The
Politics of Structural Choice: Toward a Theory of Public Bureaucracy, in ORGANIZATION THEORY:
FROM CHESTER BARNARD TO THE PRESENT AND BEYOND, 116, 136, 138 (Oliver E. Williamson
ed., 1990); Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political
Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 261, 264–71 (1987).
185 See Cass R. Sunstein & Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Second-Order Decisions, 110 ETHICS 5,
17 (1999).
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vigorously oppose those consequences.186  For example, in the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA),187
Congress sought to produce detailed laws governing the privacy of in-
dividual health records in electronic form.  After years of legislative
stalemate, Congress determined that it did not want to allow the legis-
lature’s longstanding inability to answer difficult policy questions to
continue to preclude the promulgation of necessary privacy rules.188
In deliberate anticipation of its own continued inability to act, Con-
gress created a two-step procedure that would ensure the establish-
ment of the needed rule.  Congress passed a law that provided for the
Department of Health and Human Services to submit proposed regu-
lations to Congress for its consideration, but if Congress failed to act
within a specified period of time, then the Act mandated that the De-
partment make those regulations final.189
The same policy concerns have prompted Congress to include
safeguards in the organization of Executive Branch agencies, to re-
strain certain lawmaking options, favor others, and generally insulate
the agencies from short-sightedness and other likely cognitive errors
in judgment.190  The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of
1990191 is a contemporary example.  The Act’s stated purpose is “to
provide a fair process that will result in the timely closure and realign-
ment of military installations inside the United States.”192  The impe-
tus for this special legislation was congressional realization that the
spatially and temporally limited interests of individual representatives
were precluding any kind of rational decision-making process.193  The
adverse economic consequences of military base closures to the areas
186 Jacobs, supra note 100, at 13 (citing McNollgast, The Political Origins of the Adminis- R
trative Procedure Act, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 180, 180–217 (1999)).
187 Pub. L. No. 104–191, 110 Stat. 1936.
188 See Scope of Criminal Enforcement Under 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6, Op. Off. Legal
Counsel (2005), 2005 WL 2488049, at *7 n.12, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/
hipaa_final.htm; Peter A. Winn, Confidentiality in Cyberspace: The HIPAA Privacy Rules and the
Common Law, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 617, 639–41 (2002) (explaining the history of the HIPAA).
189 See Pub. L. No. 104–191, § 264(c)(1), 110 Stat. 1936, 2033 (1996) (“If legislation
governing standards with respect to the privacy of individually identifiable health informa-
tion transmitted in connection with the transactions described . . . is not enacted by [Au-
gust 21, 1999], the Secretary of Health and Human Services shall promulgate final
regulations containing such standards not later than [February 21, 2000].”).  The Fourth
Circuit rejected a nondelegation doctrine challenge to this novel statutory scheme. See S.C.
Med. Ass’n v. Thompson, 327 F.3d 346, 351 (4th Cir. 2003).
190 See Jacobs, supra note 100, at 29–30. R
191 Pub. L. No. 101-510, 104 Stat. 1808.  I have previously written about this statute in
Richard J. Lazarus, Environmental Law After Katrina: Reforming Environmental Law by Re-
forming Environmental Lawmaking, 81 TUL. L. REV. 1019, 1049–50 (2007).  I derive this dis-
cussion from that earlier description.
192 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-510,
§ 2901(b), 104 Stat. 1808, 1808.
193 See Kenneth R. Mayer, Closing Military Bases (Finally): Solving Collective Dilemmas
Through Delegation, 20 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 393, 398 (1995).
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housing them were so serious, immediate, and focused that the politi-
cal process precluded necessary closure decisions from being made.194
The resulting patchwork of military bases around the nation both
wasted limited federal dollars and undermined effective and efficient
military operations.195  Only by creating an artificially rigid and en-
cumbered decision-making process that allowed for broader spatial
and temporal considerations (both budgetary- and defense-related) to
dominate could a more rational decision be made.196
To that end, the Act establishes a commission charged with rec-
ommending which military bases should be closed or realigned.197
The Act also creates a carefully calibrated procedure to provide
elected officials with the necessary political cover and essential
deniability.  The procedure includes initial recommendations to the
Commission from the Secretary of Defense,198 Commission recom-
mendations for presidential review,199 the President’s approval in
whole or in part of the Commission recommendations,200 the possibil-
ity of a revised Commission recommendation upon presidential disap-
proval,201 and finally allowance for congressional disapproval by joint
resolution of both chambers.202  The Act, however, specifically im-
poses significant limitations on the timing of such congressional con-
sideration, limiting the ability of individual members to hold lengthy
hearings and debates and introduce amendments.203  The legislation
identifies which congressional committees have initial jurisdiction,204
how much time they have to consider recommendations,205 when con-
sideration on each chamber’s floor is in order,206 how much time is
allowed for floor debate,207 and how any amendments are barred.208
The joint resolution is a straight up or down vote on the Commission
recommendations as a whole.209  Although the Act does not necessa-
rily bar Congress from changing those self-imposed limitations, it de-
liberately makes it harder for Congress to do so.  The Act is a restraint
that Congress plainly welcomes because it is deliberately designed to
194 See id. at 396.
195 See id.
196 See id. at 396–98.
197 See Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 § 2902(a).
198 See id. § 2903(c).
199 See id. § 2903(d).
200 See id. § 2903(e).
201 See id. § 2903(e)(3).
202 See id. § 2904(b).
203 See id. §§ 2903(b), 2908.
204 See id. § 2908(b).
205 See id. § 2908(c).
206 See id. § 2908(d)(1).
207 Id. § 2908(d)(2) (allowing two hours for floor debate).
208 Id.
209 See id. § 2908(d).
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limit Congress’ perceived accountability for decisions that may be un-
popular in the short term.210
No doubt one of the most ambitious and strikingly innovative ex-
ercises of such lawmaking authority was the creation of the Federal
Reserve Board by the President and Congress in the early twentieth
century.  With rapid technological growth and economic expansion,
the nation needed a reliable, stable national banking system.  Several
banking crises, including the Panic of 1907, made clear the urgency of
federal governmental intervention.211  Yet national leaders struggled
between reliance on private banks responsive exclusively to short-term
profit maximization forces and a national, public bank susceptible of
being captured by political leaders promoting their own competing
short-term goals.212
The Federal Reserve System was born out of this often quite
heated debate with congressional enactment of the Federal Reserve
Act in 1913.213  It was the result of a remarkable collaborative effort
spearheaded by newly-elected President Woodrow Wilson, formerly a
political science professor, Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan,
congressional leaders, and academics.214  Today, such independent
central banks are routinely considered to be classic instances of
precommitment strategies.215
The Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Federal Open Market
Committee, and twelve regional banks together wield tremendous
power over the nation’s economy.  The Board controls the size of the
money supply by buying and selling federal government securities,
regulating the amount of money that member banks must keep in
reserve, and adjusting the interest rates that are charged to banks that
seek to borrow money from the Federal Reserve System.216  The re-
gional banks serve as fiscal agents for the U.S. Treasury, but they are
210 See Mayer, supra note 193, at 397, 405–06. R
211 See ROGER T. JOHNSON, HISTORICAL BEGINNINGS . . . THE FEDERAL RESERVE 16–30
(1999), available at http://www.bos.frb.org/about/pubs/begin.pdf.
212 See id.
213 Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 221–522 (2006). See generally Federal Reserve
Bank of Kansas City, History of the Federal Reserve, FED101: The Fed. Reserve Today,
http://www.federalreserveeducation.org/fed101/History/index.cfm (last visited Apr. 5,
2009) (offering an interactive history of the Federal Reserve System from 1775 to 2003).
214 See JOHNSON, supra note 211, at 22–26; Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, supra R
note 213. R
215 See, e.g., JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATION-
ALITY 90 (1979); Sunstein & Ullmann-Margalit, supra note 185, at 13. R
216 See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: PUR-
POSES AND FUNCTIONS 3 (9th ed. 2005), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/
pf_complete.pdf.
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not themselves agencies of the federal government.  They are each
run by a nine-member board of directors.217
To insulate Board members from shorter-term political influ-
ences, the President appoints them to fourteen-year terms, which nec-
essarily cut across administrations; the Chair and Vice Chair have four-
year terms, subject to possible reappointment.  The Board also has
one distinctive advantage over ordinary Executive Branch and inde-
pendent agencies: it is not subject to the congressional appropriations
process.  The Board is self-financed by its own financial transactions.
So although the Board remains subject to congressional oversight and
Congress may, of course, amend the Federal Reserve Act at any time
(subject to either the President’s signature or veto override), the
Board enjoys virtually unparalleled insulation from budgetary limita-
tions, appropriations riders, and other techniques that members of
Congress routinely utilize to micromanage the work of federal agen-
cies on behalf of narrow congressional constituencies.218
3. The Practical Consequences of Global Climate Change and Their
Impact on Future Generations
Ironically, however, perhaps the most compelling argument in
favor of precommitment strategies in federal climate change legisla-
tion can be found in the arguments historically made against their
legitimacy.  The principal argument against precommitment strate-
gies is that the present should not be able to bind the future.219  No
doubt that argument has force in some contexts.  But no less certainly
it possesses comparatively little force if the very purpose of using
precommitment strategies is, as in federal climate change law, to pre-
clude the present from binding the future.
After all, the purpose of climate legislation is not to protect the
present at the expense of the future; precisely the opposite.  Climate
change legislation seeks primarily to protect the future at the expense
of the present.  The most serious threat that the present poses to the
future is not climate change legislation that is later hard to unravel.
The far greater threat to the future is the potential devastation and
global destablization that can occur in the absence of legislation with
such precommitment strategies.
217 See 12 U.S.C. § 248 (2006); BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note
216, at 10; The Federal Reserve Board, The Structure of the Federal Reserve System: The R
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (July 8, 2003), http://www.feder-
alreserve.gov/pubs/frseries/frseri.htm; see also David Masci, The Federal Reserve: The Issues,
10 THE CQ RESEARCHER 675, 676 (2000).
218 See 12 U.S.C. § 244; BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 216, at R
2–3.
219 See supra notes 132–83 and accompanying text. R
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Cross-temporal majorities are to a certain extent unavoidable.
Any law passed now invariably limits the prerogatives of future majori-
ties.220  At the very least, the future inherits the laws of the present
and therefore has the affirmative burden of the cumbersome process
of amending existing law.  So too, the future inherits the legal obliga-
tions and responsibilities incurred by earlier lawmakers, which cannot
be easily shed.  The future likewise inherits the natural environment,
the bounty of which can be irreparably damaged by prior
generations.221
Nor is passage of laws the only way that the present may, as a
practical matter, bind the future.  Inaction as well as action may have
irreversible consequences that dramatically limit the options available
to future generations.  The failure to enact and maintain climate
change laws is just such an inaction.  The catastrophic global
destabilization threatened by climate change would not only as a prac-
tical matter bind future generations but also potentially undermine
their ability to govern themselves using the full range of options re-
quired for greater autonomy.  It would therefore be tragically wrong
to posit that protection of the political prerogatives of the future pre-
cludes current generations from adopting laws that seek to preserve
the options of future generations.  Sometimes lawmaking limits do
weaken the future.  But sometimes, such limits strengthen the future
instead.222
III
PRECOMMITMENT STRATEGIES FOR FEDERAL
CLIMATE CHANGE LEGISLATION
Institutional design for lawmaking matters. As described above,
by structuring the “mechanisms of democracy” within our lawmaking
processes, we can and routinely do influence not only how decisions
are made, but the issues and judgments that are reached.223  We can
promote the soundness as well as the fairness of decisions, which
sometimes requires that we embrace new institutional designs for par-
220 See Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85
GEO. L.J. 491, 504–05 (1997) (acknowledging that “virtually any action taken by today’s
majority may (deleteriously) affect the future”).
221 See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111
YALE L.J. 1665, 1672, 1686–88 (2002).
222 Holmes, supra note 111, at 227 (“Limits do not necessarily weaken; they can also R
strengthen.”).
223 ADRIAN VERMEULE, MECHANISMS OF DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN WRIT SMALL
4 (2007) (“[M]echanisms of democracy are small-scale rules that structure the process by
which laws are made . . . .”); see also Adrian Vermeule, Submajority Rules: Forcing Accountabil-
ity upon Majorities, 13 J. POL. PHIL. 74, 75–76 (2005) (describing a variety of lawmaking
institutions, including Congress and the Supreme Court, that use submajority voting in
certain contexts to ensure that minority interests have voices in agenda-setting).
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ticular lawmaking challenges in anticipation of our own human na-
ture and the perceived tendencies of existing lawmaking processes.224
We can also design lawmaking processes to make it harder to unravel
legislative bargains once struck and, in effect, to “stack the deck” in
favor of certain interests and to the detriment of others as the statute
is implemented over time.225
For federal climate change legislation, asymmetric precommit-
ment strategies will be necessary because of the tremendous lawmak-
ing challenges presented by the science of climate change in
combination with human nature.  Some strategies should be focused
on making it harder for otherwise disproportionately powerful short-
term economic interests to undermine the legislation’s implementa-
tion.  Other strategies should, conversely, be designed to make the
law’s terms susceptible to influence by disproportionately politically
weaker groups, in particular those seeking to protect the diffuse inter-
ests of future generations.  In this manner, these contrasting design
features operate not unlike chutes and ladders.226  A chute is deliber-
ately designed to place a player at a disadvantage and a ladder is in-
tended to make it easier to achieve one’s objective.
Described below are some preliminary ideas, many of which are
traceable to strategies that Congress has previously embraced in other
contexts.  Some are directed to congressional lawmaking and others
to Executive Branch implementation because the risks are present in
both branches.  The ideas include tools such as interagency, scientific
advisory, and stakeholder consultation requirements to promote certain
voices; statutory and regulatory hammers to keep statutory implementa-
tion on track; federal preemption and non-preemption triggers to provide for
regulatory innovation and to recognize state sovereign prerogatives;
and limited and enhanced judicial review provisions to promote the effec-
tiveness of oversight by potentially underrepresented interests and to
diminish the power of those who are potentially unduly influential.
Absent these kinds of asymmetric precommitment strategies, cli-
mate change legislation will most likely be eroded by the daily eco-
nomic and political pressures that cannot long countenance imposing
immediate costs in return for benefits so removed temporally and spa-
tially from the present.  The erosion will be quiet yet far-reaching in
effect.  It will happen in the chambers of Congress, in the form of
compliance extensions, budgetary shortfalls, appropriations riders,
224 See, e.g., Penn, supra note 69, at 292–95 (noting, in the context of ecological conser- R
vation, the importance of observing limits on human altruism in making social policy).
225 Moe, supra note 184, at 136–38; McCubbins et al., supra note 184, at 261–63, R
264–71 (describing ways to “stack the deck” to favor policy entrenchment and prefer cer-
tain interests over others in statutory implementation).
226 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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and earmarks, and it will happen in the vast hallways of the federal
bureaucracy, in the form of delays in the promulgation of regulations,
agency interpretations of statutory mandates as nonmandatory, gener-
ous agency settlements, and simple nonenforcement of the law.
A. Congress
The most significant restraint on Congress’ ability to enact sweep-
ing revisions to federal climate change legislation is already in place.
The same fragmented system of lawmaking in Congress that the Fram-
ers supplied, further fragmented by the dizzying array of congres-
sional committees with overlapping jurisdiction over climate change,
that made legislation difficult to pass in the first instance makes it dif-
ficult to pass comprehensive amendments to that law once passed.  It
is much harder to achieve congressional passage of a significant law
than to prevent its passage; there are many opportunities within ex-
isting legislative procedures for less powerful political interests to
block a statute’s enactment, even a statute supported by powerful po-
litical constituencies.227  That is why, for instance, even a highly con-
troversial law such as the federal Superfund law,228 which has been
widely criticized by business and political leaders for its harsh liability
scheme, has largely escaped significant amendment since its passage
in 1980.229  Similarly, efforts to lift restrictions on oil exploration in
the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge foundered in Congress even when
the political party controlling both chambers of Congress and the
White House had made ending that ban a priority.230  There is a
strong tendency in our existing legislative lawmaking framework
against destabilization of existing laws, including laws that may have
been highly controversial when originally enacted.231
Some have speculated that Congress could do even more and
could formally prevent amendment of an existing law by a future Con-
gress.232  Based on that view of the entrenchment power of a legisla-
ture, Congress could constitutionally provide that an existing law
227 Rui J. P. de Figueiredo, Jr., Electoral Competition, Political Uncertainty, and Policy Insu-
lation, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 321, 322 (2002) (“Because of the multiplicity of veto points in
the legislative process under a separation of powers system, new laws are extremely difficult
to pass, for a minority can block new legislation.”).
228 “Superfund” is the popular name for the federal Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006).
229 See LAZARUS, supra note 2, at 150. R
230 See Felicity Barringer & Carl Hulse, Arctic Drilling Opponents Cheer Nip-and-Tuck Vote,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2005, at A30.
231 Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1216
(2001) (describing how super-statutes “‘stick’ in the public culture”).
232 See, e.g., Posner & Vermeule, supra note 221, at 1666, 1673–85 (suggesting that it is R
not only constitutional but also normatively attractive to allow legislatures to bind their
successors).
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could not be amended and, accordingly, render that law absolutely
binding on future Congresses, which would be powerless to change
the law.  Whatever the merit of that theory of legislative entrenchment
authority, which is at least subject to serious constitutional chal-
lenge,233 any such proposal for formal entrenchment would plainly be
a poor idea for federal climate change legislation for two reasons.
The first reason is entirely practical.  Any effort to include such
an extraordinarily far-reaching assertion of congressional authority in
federal climate legislation would by itself be so controversial as to
likely doom the initial legislative effort.  Any restraints on future law-
making proposed for inclusion in federal climate legislation will no
doubt themselves be subject to considerable debate, and their legiti-
macy should not become the lightening rod of controversy that itself
perversely prevents the legislation’s initial passage or significantly
weakens its ability to achieve its substantive goals.234  Indeed, one of
the primary political advantages of modifications of lawmaking
processes is supposed to be their susceptibility to flying under the ra-
dar of close scrutiny.235
The second reason is that absolute entrenchment of federal cli-
mate change law would be poor public policy even if within constitu-
tional bounds.  The temporal reach of federal climate change
legislation is too great and there is far too much surrounding uncer-
tainty regarding the best way to approach the problem to warrant such
a drastic legislative step. Those supporting certain dramatic steps to
address climate change may prove to be the Sirens that Ulysses must
resist.236  It is sometimes harder than one realizes to know for sure
233 See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Symmetric Entrenchment: A Con-
stitutional and Normative Theory, 89 VA. L. REV. 385, 390–415 (2003); John C. Roberts &
Erwin Chemerinsky, Entrenchment of Ordinary Legislation: A Reply to Professors Posner and
Vermeule, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1773, 1782–95 (2003) (addressing the constitutional issues that
legislative entrenchment raises).
234 See B. Dan Wood & John Bohte, Political Transaction Costs and the Politics of Adminis-
trative Design, 66 J. POL. 176, 179 (2004) (“Building a winning coalition often depends on
making compromises that place onerous restrictions on bureaucracies or result in weak
administrative designs.”).
235 It is sometimes easier politically to make laws that change lawmaking structures and
processes rather than directly change substantive law, even though the former results in
the latter.  Substantive policy proposals are more transparent and, as a result, can be more
quickly buried in debates among competing special interests; matters of institutional de-
sign can sometimes mask policy differences and cut across otherwise divergent interests.
See Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch
from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2323 (2006) (arguing that broad design choices are some-
times easier to attain by fiat or legislative inertia than by specific policies because policy
proposals may get mired in special interest competitions).
236 See Jeremy Waldron, Banking Constitutional Rights: Who Controls Withdrawals?, 52 ARK.
L. REV. 533, 547 (1999) (“What one man calls ‘greed,’ another will call ‘entitlement.’ . . .
And what one faction calls ‘rage’ or ‘panic,’ another will call ‘righteous anger’ or
‘prudence.’”).
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who the Sirens are,237 or if Peter is sober rather than drunk.238  Cer-
tainly environmental law has not been immune from moments when
moral outrage rather than cool analysis has dominated lawmaking ef-
forts.239  Congress therefore plainly needs to retain authority to
amend any legislation, like federal climate change legislation, that
purports to achieve its objectives over hundreds of years.240
There are, however, ways that one could deliberately make more
difficult the subsequent passage of legislative amendments designed
to undermine the law’s ability to achieve its objectives, while still al-
lowing for the possibility that a whole new policy approach might be
necessary.  This flexibility could be accomplished by making the politi-
cal cost of such amendments high enough to ensure that they could
be enacted only with widespread and fairly overwhelming political
support and therefore beyond the easy reach of powerful political
forces driven by only short-term interests.
One potentially powerful technique would be to couple domestic
climate change legislation with the United States’ agreement to inter-
national treaty obligations by making clear that the former was in-
tended to comply with obligations under the latter.  These could be
obligations related to the kind of multilateral agreements that will be
negotiated in Copenhagen in 2009.241  Or, more easily, such obliga-
tions could even be tied to multilateral agreements with a smaller sub-
set of nations.  In either event, such international treaty obligations,
although subject to abrogation, would significantly raise the political
cost of any retreat from domestic legislation designed to fulfill those
international obligations.  As a result, both Congress and the Execu-
tive Branch would be especially cautious about any appearance of a
retreat and oversight of domestic implementation of climate change
legislation would, as a practical matter, extend to governments
overseas.
237 See Louis Michael Seidman, Ambivalence and Accountability, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1571,
1591 n.64 (1988) (suggesting that an individual’s will or desire is often context-
dependent).
238 JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERN-
MENT 130 (2001) (describing how “Peter sober” legislating for “Peter drunk” may turn out
to be “Peter drunk” legislating for “Peter sober”); see also supra note 152 and accompanying R
text.
239 Christopher H. Schroeder, Cool Analysis Versus Moral Outrage in the Development of
Federal Environmental Criminal Law, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 251, 253–57 (1993) (presenting
“cool analysis” and “moral outrage” as two competing approaches to environmental
policy).
240 Cf. Sunstein, supra note 102, at 858–59, 866 (contrasting precommitment value R
with option value of keeping future options open to change directions in light of better
information).
241 See Michael von Bu¨low, The Countdown to Copenhagen, UNITED NATIONS CLIMATE
CHANGE CONFERENCE, Jan. 23, 2009, http://en.cop15.dk/news/view–ews?newsid=578.
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Another possibility would be to design federal climate legislation
in a manner that would create a powerful political constituency with a
strong economic incentive favoring the legislation’s preservation.  For
instance, one reason for the failure of regulatory reform efforts
launched during the 104th Congress to cut back on air, water, and
hazardous waste control laws was that, by that time, much of the econ-
omy had already been effectively “greened” in response to those
laws.242  New businesses had emerged and economic values, including
property values, had formed in reliance on the environmental protec-
tions promised by those laws.243  As a result, there were powerful busi-
ness interests and other constituencies that found value in the tough
pollution control requirements and strongly resisted their undoing.244
Federal climate change legislation could include provisions delib-
erately designed to create such constituencies.  Such provisions
should not be difficult to create.  The tradable emissions program is
expected to generate billions of dollars in revenue from the sale of
emissions rights.245  Those revenues will in turn be allocated to ad-
dress climate change concerns, ranging from efforts to develop more
efficient technologies capable of reducing greenhouse gas emissions
to assistance to persons and places likely to suffer from both the cli-
mate change no longer avoidable and dislocations caused by a shift to
an economy that produces lower emissions.246  Recipients of those
funds will have a strong incentive to resist legislative amendments that
threaten the continued availability of such financial support.
A more finely tuned design feature to resist future amendments
proposed by narrow interest groups to relax the law’s requirements
would be to include language in the original bill that directly impeded
the passage of such amendments or at least limited their effectiveness
once passed.  Requiring that amendments to relax emissions reduc-
tion requirements be passed by supermajorities would no doubt be
242 See LAZARUS, supra note 2, at 161. R
243 See id. (noting “by the mid 1990s, [environmental protection laws had] been in
place for virtually a generation” and that “[p]owerful economic interests had, during that
time, invested millions if not billions of dollars in compliance with those laws”).
244 Id. at 161–62 (arguing that many large companies who had “internalized environ-
mental law” by the late 1990s “no longer so naturally welcomed the destabilization and
legal uncertainty that would likely result from widespread reinvention and reformation
efforts” and noting that by 2000, the market for the pollution control industry in the
United States was more than $200 billion and accounted for more than 1.4 million jobs).
245 See Peter Crampton & Suzi Kerr, Tradeable Carbon Permit Auctions: How and Why to
Auction Not Grandfather, 30 ENERGY POL’Y 333, 334 (2002) (discussing the revenue-generat-
ing possibilities of a tradable emissions permit auction and contending that such a system
could raise $125 billion per year).
246 See, e.g., Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2008, S. 3036, 110th Cong. tits.
V, VI, IX; H.R.__, 110th Cong., tits. I (§§ 724–29), VI (Discussion Draft, as reported by H.
Comm. on Energy & Commerce, Oct. 7, 2008) [hereinafter Dingell-Boucher Discussion
Draft].
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too controversial, even if the provision avoided the most serious con-
stitutional issue by also making clear that a future Congress could lift
that requirement based on a majority vote.  But there are other pos-
sibilities, analytically similar though likely less controversial.  For in-
stance, the original legislation could provide that future efforts to
relax emissions reduction requirements would be legal only if accom-
panied at the time of congressional consideration by a congressionally
delegated entity’s formal analysis of the impact of the proposed relax-
ation on the law’s ability to achieve its goals.  Such a procedural hur-
dle, in the form of a consideration and information disclosure
requirement, would undoubtedly make it harder to enact an amend-
ment.  And the most serious constitutional objections to such a re-
quirement could be addressed by making clear in the initial
legislation that a future Congress would retain authority by majority
vote to lift that procedural requirement completely or as applied to a
particular amendment.247
A lesser, but also potentially effective, limitation would be for the
original legislation to declare a canon of construction for the statute’s
interpretation.  For instance, the law could provide that any future
amendments designed to relax the law’s requirements for particular
activities would be presumed to last no more than a statutorily speci-
fied number of years, unless the amendment expressly provided oth-
erwise.  Such a canon could, as a practical matter, limit the impact of
future efforts to undermine the law’s ability to achieve its objectives.
Here too, the provision could avoid the most serious potential consti-
tutional objections by making clear that a future Congress could, of
course, eliminate the canon by a simple majority vote in the same
manner as any other law.  As described above, however, what is theo-
retically possible to accomplish legislatively is much harder, as a prac-
tical matter, to do.
A different tack would be to limit more directly the lawmaking
avenue most susceptible to being used by powerful, narrowly focused
interests seeking to gain short term economic advantage: the appro-
priations process.  To the great detriment of environmental law, it is
the appropriations process that has most lent itself to such efforts by
riddling environmental law with appropriations riders and ear-
marks.248  One possible anticipatory response would be to include the
above procedural hurdles or canons of statutory construction but tar-
get them directly to laws enacted exclusively through the appropria-
tions process.  The justification would be the shared understanding
that the appropriations process does not lend itself to the careful de-
247 For a discussion of potential constitutional objections relating to “entrenchment”
of legislation, see supra notes 232–43 and accompanying text. R
248 See supra note 96 and accompanying text. R
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liberations generally warranted for major changes in substantive
law.249
A far bolder move, however, would be to insulate parts of the
greenhouse gas emissions reduction and climate change adaptation
programs from the appropriations process altogether.  What Congress
did with the Federal Reserve Board provides the legislative precedent.
Congress allowed the Federal Reserve Board to retain revenue it gen-
erated in its operations in order to shield the Board from the politics
of the congressional appropriations process.250  The same could be
done in the context of climate change.  Implementation of federal
climate change legislation will, assuming a tradable emissions pro-
gram, generate billions of dollars in revenue.251  Some of that revenue
could be used to insulate the especially vulnerable aspects of the
greenhouse gas regulation program from the appropriations process
and therefore the short-term economic interests that tend to domi-
nate that particular lawmaking avenue.
B. Executive Branch Lawmaking
There are many ways to design climate change legislation in an-
ticipation of problems that may arise in the Executive Branch’s admin-
istration of the law.  Some measures could be designed to insulate
agency officials to some extent from political pressures, especially
those pressures likely to derive from short-term economic concerns,
which undermine the law’s effectiveness.252  Other measures could be
crafted to enhance the influence of interest groups that are con-
cerned about protecting future generations but which otherwise lack
the necessary economic or political clout.  Some of the possibilities
worthy of consideration are catalogued and described below.
1. Insulating (Somewhat) Agency Officials from Politics
A variety of measures could be used to try to insulate agency offi-
cials from the short-term political pressures that could undermine a
climate change statute’s effective, fair, and impartial administration.
None purports to achieve complete insulation, nor should they.  Polit-
249 See Lazarus, supra note 4, at 632–33 (arguing that because of a rise of appropria- R
tions legislation in the environmental context, “Congress has displayed no ability to engage
in the deliberate policymaking essential to thoughtful resolution of the difficult economic,
social, and moral issues raised by environmental lawmaking”).
250 See supra note 218 and accompanying text. R
251 See Crampton & Kerr, supra note 245, at 334 (“[A]n efficient auction could raise R
$125 billion annually.”); Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to Address
Climate Change, 32 HARV. ENVTL L. REV. 293, 317 n.94 (2008) (citing U.S. Energy Informa-
tion Administration data for the proposition that an economy-wide emissions permit auc-
tion could generate annual revenue in excess of $100 billion).
252 See BREYER, supra note 107, at 62–63 (discussing the advantages of insulation of R
agencies in terms of “rules, practices, and procedures”).
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ical influence is neither all bad nor all inappropriate.  Quite often,
some political accountability is necessary for a law’s legitimacy, espe-
cially if, as would no doubt be true for climate change law, all discre-
tionary decisions are not susceptible to being answered by objective
factual inquiry divorced from broader policy considerations.253  The
purpose of such insulating measures is to temper, not eliminate, the
influence of politics on statutory implementation.254
For instance, federal climate change legislation could define in
some detail the qualifications and tenures of specific agency officials
charged with particularly important and sensitive statutory responsibil-
ities.  There is no reason for Congress to delegate complete discretion
on such potentially important matters to the President, cabinet secre-
tary, agency head, or other agency officials.  Several possibilities are
described below.
a. Staggered terms of agency official appointment that cut across presi-
dential administrations and thereby promote political autonomy re-
present a classic legislative technique for reducing political influence.
The staggered term alone sends a strong message both to the Presi-
dent and the Senate, which is responsible for the confirmation pro-
cess, that the person to be chosen is not a standard political appointee
for whose appointment the President is owed heightened political def-
erence.255  The individual’s qualifications are instead intended to
transcend political loyalty to the current presidential administration
and reflect an expertise grounded more directly in the statutory re-
sponsibilities and fiduciary responsibilities of the agency position
under consideration.256
253 See id. at 77 (“[S]ince many risk-related choices are, and must remain, inherently
political, to insulate totally the group’s major policy decisions from those of politically
responsible officials is neither desirable nor possible.”).
254 See id. at 77–78.
255 See Wood & Bohte, supra note 234, at 185–86 (noting the effect of staggered terms, R
as well as other devices, on agency autonomy versus “political responsiveness”).
256 There is already plenty of precedent for such an approach to appointment of
agency officials.  The Federal Reserve Board is an obvious example. See supra note 218 and R
accompanying text.  Under the Federal Reserve Act, the President, with the advice and
consent of the Senate, appoints members of the Board generally to fourteen-year terms,
which extend far beyond the term of any President, even assuming reelection to a second
term.  12 U.S.C. § 241 (2006).  From those on the Board, the President can pick a Chair-
man and Vice Chairman who, again upon Senate confirmation, serve for four-year terms,
which may well cross presidential administrations. Id. § 242.  The Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation is another example.  By statute, the President appoints the Direc-
tor to a ten-year term, subject to Senate confirmation. See 28 U.S.C. § 532 (2006) (com-
menting in a historical note that the Director’s term shall be ten years).  Many other
examples exist.  The commissioners of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Federal
Communications Commission, and Federal Election Commission each have terms fixed by
statutes.  FEC commissioners serve for single six-year terms that are deliberately staggered
by three two-year intervals. See 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(2)(A) (2006).  SEC commissioners serve
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b. Length of the agency official appointment is an important related
design feature for promoting agency autonomy.  The longer the ap-
pointment, the more a government official will potentially feel insu-
lated from political pressures surrounding the implementation of the
law for which she is responsible.257  It takes no great imagination to
appreciate that someone with a two-year term will feel more accounta-
ble to political pressures than someone with a fourteen-year appoint-
ment, as in the case of the Federal Reserve Board.  That is precisely
why members of Congress are elected every two years—so that they
will feel constant accountability—and members of the Federal Reserve
Board generally have fourteen-year terms—so that they will not.  For
the purposes of implementing climate change law, in particular,
longer agency-official terms are quite important because they are
more in keeping with the longer-term agenda of climate change.258  A
longer term of appointment also sends a strong message to Congress
that this is not a standard political appointment, but rather one that
warrants a more searching inquiry into a nominee’s background and
expertise for such a position.259
c. Grounds for agency official removal are another potentially effec-
tive design feature.  For instance, the President can remove members
of the Federal Reserve Board from their position only “for cause.”260
This sharply limits the President’s authority and leverage over the
agency decisionmaker.  Even absent a formal statutory declaration
that removal is available only for cause, just providing a lengthy term
of appointment persuades some courts to infer a “for cause” require-
ment,261 and may, as a practical matter, render the political cost of
for five-year terms.  15 U.S.C. § 78d (2006).  FCC Commissioners also have five-year terms.
47 U.S.C. § 154(c) (2006).
257 See Wood & Bohte, supra note 234, at 186 (noting the potential effect of term R
length on the level of agency autonomy).
258 See Amihai Glazer & Vesa Kanniainen, Short-Term Leaders Should Make Long-Term Ap-
pointments, 14 INT’L TAX PUB. FIN. 55, 56–57 (2007) (discussing the importance of long-
term appointments in general).
259 Id. at 55–57.
260 12 U.S.C. § 242.
261 For the FEC, FCC, and SEC, however, none of three federal governing statutes
expressly provide the grounds, if any, for presidential removal of a commissioner. See, e.g.,
2 U.S.C. § 437c; 15 U.S.C. § 78d; 47 U.S.C. § 154(c).  The courts, however, have generally
accepted the notion that even if a federal statute is silent on the grounds for presidential
removal of an agency official, the statute may be read, in light of the purpose and structure
of the commission, to allow for removal only for cause. See Wiener v. United States, 357
U.S. 349, 354–55 (1958) (holding that tenure protection may be inferred from statutory
silence in the context of the War Claims Commission); FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund,
6 F.3d 821, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (concluding that the FEC was “likely correct” that “the
President can remove the commissioners only for good cause, which limitation is implied
by the Commission’s structure and mission as well as the commissioners’ terms”); SEC v.
Blinder, Robinson & Co., 855 F.2d 677, 681 (10th Cir. 1988) (“[F]or the purposes of this
case, we accept . . . that it is commonly understood that the President may remove a com-
missioner [of the SEC] only for ‘inefficiency, neglect of duty or malfeasance in office.’”);
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removing an official too high.262  Because political pressure on agency
officials implementing climate change law is especially great, there
might even be reason to limit their removal by procedural mecha-
nisms beyond the substantive requirement of “for cause.”  There is no
judicially established constitutional requirement that an agency offi-
cial be subject to the President’s plenary power to remove.263  Accord-
ingly, there are myriad ways that this design feature could be crafted
to narrow the grounds for removal while maintaining the safety valve
that allows for removal in case of an extreme circumstance of derelic-
tion of duty or judgment.264
d. Agency official qualifications and disqualifications could also be
statutorily prescribed.  Such express qualifications and disqualifica-
tions help to ensure that the best-qualified individual receives an ap-
pointment.  The qualifications (and disqualifications) serve to limit
significantly those who can be brought to the President’s attention as
possible nominees, empower the Senate to take more seriously its role
in confirmation, and provide Senators with a touchstone for evaluat-
ing credentials.  There is plenty of analogous congressional prece-
dent, ranging from requirements that the Solicitor General of the
United States be “learned in the law”265 to requirements that the Di-
see also Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 398 (1995) (suggesting by direct
negative comparison that “commissioners of independent regulatory agencies” are “remov-
able by the President for cause,” although incorrectly suggesting that such removal for
cause is set forth “by the explicit terms of the statute” for the SEC and FCC).
262 For example, federal law nowhere provides that the President must find cause to
remove the FBI Director, and the President is legally free to remove the FBI Director at any
time.  The mere fact, however, that the federal statute creates a presumptive ten-year term
serves as a significant political constraint on the President’s doing so.  As one member of
Congress explained at the time the ten-year tenure rule was adopted, “the setting of a 10-
year term of office by Congress would, as a practical matter, preclude—or at least inhibit—
a President from arbitrarily dismissing an FBI Director for political reasons, since a succes-
sor would have to be confirmed by the Senate.”  122 CONG. REC. 23,809 (1976) (statement
of Sen. Byrd). President Bill Clinton’s ongoing dispute with FBI Director Louis Freeh, who
openly criticized the President and pointedly did not resign from office until after Presi-
dent Bush assumed office, illustrates the political limits on the president’s authority to
control the Director’s position. See, e.g., The Federal Bureau of Independence, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
18, 1997, at A26; Mr. Freeh Retires, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2001, at A24.
263 See Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 626–27 (1935) (“[T]o
hold that . . . the members of the commission continue in office at the mere will of the
President, might be to thwart, in large measure, the very ends which Congress sought to
realize by definitely fixing the term of office.”).
264 A statute might, for instance, describe the removal grounds in some detail to make
it clear that the grounds are not entirely open-ended.  One could also go further and
create a procedure for considering a claim that grounds for removal were present and
provide for a board to review the merits of that claim.  The board members themselves
could represent a cross-section of relevant perspectives, including those more likely to be
sensitive to longer term concerns.  A simple majority might not even be enough to sustain
the claim that removal is warranted.
265 Act of June 22, 1870, ch. 150, § 2, 16 Stat. 162 (“[T]here shall be in said Depart-
ment an officer learned in the law, to assist the Attorney-General in the performance of his
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rector of the Park Service have “substantial experience and demon-
strated competence in land management and natural or cultural
resource conservation.”266  Congress could well be within its bounds
in prescribing relevant professional background and expertise for
agency officials with significant responsibility for implementing cli-
mate change law.  Congress could also, as it has often done elsewhere,
proscribe  qualifications and disqualifications intended to promote bi-
partisanship267 or to avoid financial conflicts of interest that could
skew agency decision making.268
2. Structuring the Implementation Process to Diminish the Influence
of Short-Term Interests Likely to Be Unduly Influential and
to Promote Consideration of Longer-Term Interests
Otherwise Unlikely to Receive Their Due Weight
A second category of institutional design features pertains to
techniques for ensuring that certain kinds of factors are given due
consideration and that others are not given undue weight during the
Executive Branch’s implementation of climate change legislation.
These techniques can be used to promote accountability, deliberative-
ness, impartiality, and transparency in general.269 Alternatively, they
can be shaped to ensure that specific factors that are anticipated to be
duties, to be called the solicitor general . . . .”).  Of historical interest, before Congress
added the position of Solicitor General, the Attorney General was required to be “learned
in the law.”  Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92–93 (“And there shall . . . be
appointed a meet person, learned in the law, to act as attorney-general for the United
States . . . .”).
266 16 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).  Members of the FEC are to be selected based upon “their
experience, integrity, impartiality, and good judgment.”  2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(3) (2006).
The entire institutional design of the Foreign Service within the State Department is in-
tended to promote the establishment of a bureaucracy of elite federal employees proud of
their substantive expertise, autonomy, and independent judgment in service of the long-
term interests of the nation in foreign affairs. See Katyal, supra note 235, at 2328–31. R
267 For instance, members of the FCC, FEC, and SEC must represent different political
parties.  No more than three of the five members of the SEC “shall be members of the
same political party and in making appointments members of different political parties
shall be appointed alternately as nearly as may be practicable.”  15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2006).
The FEC similarly includes a three-out-of-six member ceiling for the same political party
and also expressly provides for staggered terms for pairs of appointees from two different
political parties.  2 U.S.C. §§ 437c(a)(1)–(2).  The applicable provision for the FCC pro-
vides only that “[t]he maximum number of commissioners who may be members of the
same political party shall be a number equal to the least number of commissioners which
constitutes a majority of the full membership of the Commission.”  47 U.S.C. § 154(b)(5)
(2006).
268 Federal law lists a series of such disqualifications based on financial interests for
FCC Commissioners, 47 U.S.C. § 154(b)(2), a general prohibition for SEC Commissioners,
15 U.S.C. § 78d(a), and an extensive prohibition on any employment by the executive,
legislative, or judicial branches of the federal government for the FEC, 2 U.S.C.
§ 437c(a)(3).
269 See VERMEULE, supra note 223, at 4–5 (proposing mechanisms that advance these R
core values of democratic constitutionalism).
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undervalued instead receive their due.  Several possibilities are de-
scribed below.
a. Interagency consultation requirements are one standard mecha-
nism for Congress to promote a fuller consideration of relevant fac-
tors and therefore reduce the prospects of a narrow, short-term
interest hijacking a law’s implementation.270  If, for instance, there is
reason for concern that the agency may fail to provide adequate
weight to the requirements of a particular federal statute to which it is
subject, it has become fairly routine to require that agency to consult
formally with another agency that shares the same primary mission of
the federal statute.271  That formal consultation not only provides the
action agency with relevant information that may prompt the agency
to reach a different decision, but it also places the consultant agency’s
views in the administrative record.272  As a result, should the agency
taking action ignore the consultant agency’s counsel or refuse to en-
gage in the consultation altogether, it may very quickly find itself vul-
nerable to a successful lawsuit brought by those disappointed by the
agency’s decision.273
270 Interagency consultation requirements are a regular feature of environmental stat-
utes.  For instance, the Endangered Species Act (ESA) requires that federal agencies sub-
ject to section 7 of the Act consult with the Secretary of the Interior (for terrestrial wildlife
or plants) or the Secretary of Commerce (for marine life) if they believe that an endan-
gered or threatened species may be adversely affected by a contemplated agency action.
See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1) (2006).  The consultation results in a formal biological opinion
by the Fish and Wildlife Service (for the Secretary of the Interior) or National Marine
Fisheries Service (for the Secretary of Commerce). See id. § 1536(b)(3)–(4).  The biologi-
cal opinion considers the potential for such an adverse effect to occur and whether reason-
able alternatives exist for its avoidance. See id.  Another example of an existing, effective
interagency consultation requirement is section 309 of the Clean Air Act, which requires
federal agencies preparing environmental impact statements pursuant to the National En-
vironmental Policy Act to provide the EPA with an opportunity to review their draft impact
statements.  42 U.S.C. § 7609 (2006) (“The Administrator shall review and comment in
writing on the environmental impact of any matter relating to duties and responsibilities
granted pursuant to this chapter or other provisions of the authority of the Administra-
tor . . . .”).  The Council on Environmental Quality regulations similarly require consulta-
tion with offices in other agencies of the federal government with relevant expertise.  40
C.F.R. § 1502.19(a) (2008) (requiring agencies to circulate the entire draft to “[a]ny Fed-
eral agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any environ-
mental impact involved”).
271 See J. R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Public Agencies as Lobbyists, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
2217, 2261–63, 2288–92, 2295–2300 (2005) (describing the impact on agency decisions of
congressionally mandated interagency consultation, including potential enhanced consid-
eration of environmental concerns).
272 See id.
273 See, e.g., Am. Bird Conservancy, Inc. v. FCC, 516 F.3d 1027, 1031 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(striking down the FCC categorical exclusion of communication towers from National En-
vironmental Policy Act analysis for failing to provide for required consultation with the
Fish and Wildlife Service); Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 701 F.2d 1011,
1019–24 (2d Cir. 1983) (relying on negative comments in the administrative record sup-
plied by the EPA, National Marine Fisheries Service, and Fish and Wildlife Service regard-
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Such an interagency consultation requirement might well be ap-
propriate for climate change legislation given the wide-ranging impli-
cations of climate change rules and therefore the number of other
agency offices with potentially relevant expertise.  It could also be de-
liberately enlisted to make it difficult for any one agency to create
exceptions or otherwise modify climate law’s requirements.  For in-
stance, the statute could provide a strict process for any relaxation of
legal requirements.  In short, the purpose of this statutorily created
body would, in some respects, be the opposite of the purpose of the
body created by Congress in the Endangered Species Act—referred to
as the “God Squad”—which was to allow the lifting of restrictions nec-
essary to prevent a species from extinction.274  The interagency con-
clusion process in climate change legislation could, by contrast, be
aimed at making it harder to create an exemption, rather than
easier.275
b. Creation of a new expert governmental entity would be an even
more direct way for Congress to ensure that certain interests are given
due weight during agency implementation of climate change legisla-
tion.  This office would provide an authoritative voice guided by ca-
reer government experts who were more insulated from political
pressures.276  Such an office would have either the right to consult
and comment on proposals or affirmative authority to oversee the stat-
ute’s implementation.  For climate change, Congress could take the
bold step of creating an office with the formal responsibility of safe-
ing the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ proposal to grant a wetlands development permit
associated with construction of a major highway).
274 See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e), (g), (h) (describing the broad powers given to the Endan-
gered Species Committee to exempt certain federal agency activities from Endangered
Species Act restrictions on federal agency activities that jeopardize the continued existence
of endangered or threatened species); John Copeland Nagle, Playing Noah, 82 MINN. L.
REV. 1171, 1172 (1998) (describing the operation of the Endangered Species Committee
and its frequent characterization as the “God Squad”).
275 The Clean Water Act actually contains a limited absolute bar on relaxing certain
requirements of discharge permits. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(o) (2006) (supplying an anti-
backsliding provision).
276 See BREYER, supra note 107, at 70–71 (describing the insulation of the French Con- R
seil d’Etat).  To some extent, this proposal resembles what EPA Administrator William
Reilly did at the close of his tenure.  He created the EPA Administrative Appeals Court,
which hears and decides appeals of challenges to rulings by EPA administrative law judges.
Such rulings had previously been subject to appeal to the EPA Administrator, where the
risk was much greater that politics would influence the outcome in fact or in appearance.
Decisions of the Appeals Court are not subject to Administrator review unless the Appeals
Court seeks such review.  Instead they are subject to review only by the federal judiciary.
See 40 C.F.R. § 1.25(e) (2008).  Administrator Reilly adopted this reform for the purpose of
“inspiring confidence in the fairness of Agency adjudications.”  Changes to Regulations to
Reflect the Role of the New Environmental Appeals Board in Agency Adjudications, 57
Fed. Reg. 5320 (Feb. 13, 1992).
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guarding the interests of future generations.277  That office could be
provided with a range of authorities and responsibilities, from mere
reporting authority and formal consultation rights to actual veto au-
thority over certain kinds of decisions.  No obvious domestic analogue
currently exists,278 although the Council on Environmental Quality
within the Executive Office of the President is certainly expected to
provide a voice within that Office for environmental concerns in gen-
eral.  There have, however, been past proposals to establish such an
office in the United States,279 and at least a few other nations have
done so.280
277 This idea finds an interesting parallel in previous suggestions of other commenta-
tors that human cognitive limits, in particular the “availability heuristic,” might warrant a
lawmaking design feature to guard against the human tendency to exaggerate and over-
react to certain perceived threats. See Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 67, at 556.  The R
recommendation was to counter this tendency by requiring federal agencies to use peer
scientific review or to consult a website providing neutral information concerning risk.
Another recommendation was to increase the power of the Office of Management and
Budget’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs to review a federal agency’s decision
based on the former’s own risk assessment. See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 77, at 754–58; R
see also BREYER, supra note 107, at 60 (proposing “creation of a small, centralized adminis- R
trative group, charged with a rationalizing mission”).  My proposal is similar in that it looks
to institutional design but is very differently derived and directed.  My concern in the con-
text of climate change finds its origins in the potential for an “unavailability heuristic” and
the corresponding need to guard against underregulation rather than overregulation.
278 An extremely rough analogue in existing domestic law might be the Office of In-
spector General, which currently exists within most Executive Branch agencies.  Congress
created the Inspectors General to serve as watchdogs to guard against anticipated abuse or
neglect of statutory agency duties and authorities. See Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101 (establishing the Office of Inspector General and listing its
purpose and duties). See generally PAUL C. LIGHT, MONITORING GOVERNMENT: INSPECTORS
GENERAL AND THE SEARCH FOR ACCOUNTABILITY (1993) (discussing the influence of Inspec-
tors General on government).  Each Inspector General is deliberately insulated from the
politics of the Administration and has control over his or her own professional staff. See
Katyal, supra note 235, at 2347.  An Inspector General report can be highly influential R
because it can expose wrongdoing within an agency that the agency cannot easily ignore.
See, e.g., David Johnston & Eric Lipton, Gonzalez Met with Advisors on Dismissals: Record Seems
at Odds with Past Comments, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2007, at A1 (discussing investigation into
Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez carried out by Inspector General); Philip Shenon, In-
spection Notes Errors in Terror List, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2007, at A24 (discussing errors found
by an Inspector General in a Justice Department terrorist watch list and the resulting out-
cry); David Stout, F.B.I. Head Admits Mistakes in Use of Security Act: Data Wrongly Obtained;
Report Details Improper Demands for Records—Bipartisan Anger, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2007, at A1
(reporting the FBI Director’s acknowledgment of improper use of the Patriot Act following
an Inspector General’s report).
279 See EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW,
COMMON PATRIMONY, AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY 124–26 (1989).
280 See id.  In Germany, there is an advocate within the government whose focus is on
long-term policies and protection of the interests of future generations. See Gu¨nter Krings,
Member of the Bundestag, Address at European Sustainability Berlin: Linking Policies and
Implementation: Making SD Strategies a Case for Parliamentary Activities (June 3–5,
2007), available at http://www.eeac-net.org/workgroups/pdf/ESB07/ESB07_Dinner_
speech_Krings_07-06-03.pdf.  In Sweden, there is an “Institute of Future Studies,” which is
responsible for producing reports that focus on the future to ensure its general considera-
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c. Provisions for consideration of more neutral, objective scientific exper-
tise during statutory implementation can also provide a means for
Congress to guide a statute’s future implementation within the Execu-
tive Branch.  Expert scientific consultation can both diminish the in-
fluence of politically powerful short-term economic interests and
promote consideration of longer-term consequences if supported by
scientific evidence.  There are a wide variety of techniques that Con-
gress could use, and has used in prior laws,281 to provide for consider-
ation of such expert scientific advice in federal climate legislation.
Congress could provide merely for the production of a report unat-
tached to any particular agency rulemaking, or a narrowly focused re-
view by an expert group of scientists of a specific agency decision.
The scope of such a report or review could  range from an entire set
of rules to a specific environmental protection requirement.  The
agency itself (or a separate office within the agency) could employ the
scientists or the scientists could be formally outside the agency’s em-
ployment in order to promote independent scientific judgment.
The Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries
Service are examples of agency-employed scientific expertise.  Exam-
ples of non-agency-employed expert scientists whom Congress has
charged to provide an agency with formal advice include the Clean
Air Science Advisory Committee, created by Congress to provide the
EPA with advice in the implementation of the Clean Air Act,282 and
tion in governmental lawmaking. See Sandrine Paillard, Futures Studies and Public Decision
Making in Sweden, 8 FORESIGHT 56, 57–58 (2006).  The Israeli Knesset includes a Commis-
sion on Future Generations. See KNESSET, COMMISSION FOR FUTURE GENERATIONS, http://
www.knesset.gov.il/sponsorship/future/eng/future_index.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2009).
And in Hungary, there is a Parliamentary Commissioner for Future Generations. See PAR-
LIAMENTARY COMMISSIONER FOR FUTURE GENERATIONS: ABOUT THE OFFICE, http://www.jno.
hu/en/col1=&menu=about (last visited Mar. 18, 2009).  Some writers have also recently
suggested the possibility of electing to the legislature formal representatives of future gen-
erations, with varying suggestions concerning the qualifications of candidates for election
and whether they should be allowed two votes rather than the normal single vote. See
Andrew Dobson, Representative Democracy and the Environment, in DEMOCRACY AND THE ENVI-
RONMENT 124, 124–39 (William M. Lafferty & James Meadowcroft eds., 1996) (advocating
two votes for future generation representatives); Kristian Skagen Ekeli, Giving a Voice to
Posterity: Deliberative Democracy and Representation of Future People, 18 J. AGRIC. & ENVTL. ETH-
ICS 429–50 (2005) (advocating that voters elect both regular representatives and future
generation representatives); Tine Stein, Does the Constitutional and Democratic System Work?
The Ecological Crisis as a Challenge to the Political Order of Constitutional Democracy, 4 CONSTEL-
LATIONS 420–49 (1998) (describing an “ecological council” elected by the legislature, with
longer terms than regular legislators and with power to delay legislation).
281 See generally SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISERS AS POLICYMAKERS
(1990) (describing widespread use of science advisors in federal agency lawmaking).
282 Under the Clean Air Act, the EPA Administrator is instructed to appoint “an inde-
pendent scientific review committee” to review the science and make recommendations
concerning the establishment of national ambient quality standards.  42 U.S.C.
§ 7409(d)(2)(A) (2006).  The statute describes some of the membership qualifications,
including at least one physician and a member from the National Academy of Sciences. Id.
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the “committee of scientists” created by Congress in the National For-
est Management Act to provide the Forest Service with advice for de-
veloping environmental principles for the management of the
nation’s forests.283  The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) utilizes
a dizzying array of expert federal advisory committees of scientists and
medical experts in administering its regulatory authority.284
Agencies that ignore the advice of congressionally designated sci-
entific experts do so at their legal and political peril.285  But, given
those stakes, safeguards are often needed to protect against the natu-
ral tendency of special interests to seek to capture the scientific review
process itself.  In recent years, there has been rising concern that oc-
casions for expert scientific review have become just another forum
for adversarial debates between experts funded by opposing sides of
policy disputes rather than true opportunities for informed scientific
discussion, deliberation, and consensus.286  There are nonetheless
ways to craft the selection of scientists that reduce that risk and create
incentives to diminish the influence of biased, advocacy science.287
The commendable success of the IPCC over decades in providing the
world with careful, deliberative assessments of the state of climate sci-
ence is a wonderful example.288  There also exist within the United
The statute requires the committee to make formal recommendations to the Administra-
tion on several matters, including “new national ambient air quality standards and revi-
sions of existing criteria and standards as may be appropriate.” Id. § 7409(d)(2)(B).
283 16 U.S.C. § 1604(h)(1) (2006).
284 See generally INST. OF MED., FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. ADVISORY COMMS. (Richard A.
Rettig et al. eds., 1992) (listing and evaluating the external advisory committees used in
administrative decision making); JASANOFF, supra note 281, at 152–79 (detailing the FDA’s R
advisory network).
285 See Felicity Barringer, Report Says Interior Official Overrode Work of Scientists, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 29, 2007, at A19 (“A top-ranking official overseeing the Fish and Wildlife Ser-
vice at the Interior Department rode roughshod over agency scientists, and decisions made
on her watch may not survive court challenges . . . .”); Juliet Eilperin, EPA Tightens Pollution
Standards: But Agency Ignored Advisers’ Guidance, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2008, at A1 (“[The
administrator’s] decision to set a lower but still less-restrictive limit than what the EPA’s
advisory committees had recommended sparked a backlash from Democratic lawmakers,
public health advocates and his own independent advisers.”); see also Holly Doremus, Scien-
tific and Political Integrity in Environmental Policy, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1601, 1603–17 (2008)
(describing a series of controversies involving alleged political manipulation of science in
the administration of environmental laws).
286 See THOMAS O. MCGARITY & WENDY E. WAGNER, BENDING SCIENCE: HOW SPECIAL
INTERESTS CORRUPT PUBLIC HEALTH RESEARCH 7–12 (2008) (describing the negative impact
of advocacy groups on the use of scientific data in regulatory law).
287 See id. at 259–60, 262–69, 283–90 (making a series of institutional reform proposals
designed to promote independent scientific advice to agency decision making).
288 See supra notes 7 and 138 and accompanying text.  The IPCC itself is a terrific exam- R
ple of how, by institutional design, lawmakers can be provided with expertise critical to
their formulation of laws.  The IPCC was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2007 along with
former Vice President Al Gore. See Walter Gibbs & Sarah Lyall, Gore Shares Peace Prize for
Climate Change Work: Nobel Also Honors Panel of Scientists from the U.N., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13,
2007, at A1.
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States itself reputable institutions, such as the National Academies of
Sciences and more narrowly focused organizations such as the Health
Effects Institute,289 which focuses on automobile emissions, that
demonstrate that it can be done.
With the necessary safeguards, federal climate change legislation
should be able to offer multiple opportunities for Congress to build
into the implementation process expert scientific consultation re-
quirements that keep the statute on its long-term track and prevent its
short-term derailment.290  Such expert scientific advice can serve,
moreover, as an especially important check to ensure that any future
efforts to significantly redirect the statutory focus based on a newly
discovered understanding of climate science or available technology
find support in actual scientific advances rather than political science
fiction.291
d. Participatory rights for selected stakeholders can also be expressly
provided for in the lawmaking process in order to ensure that impor-
tant but less politically powerful voices are heard during statutory im-
plementation.  There is much statutory precedent for such a feature.
Some precedents are in the form of federal advisory committees and
provide for an advisory function with varying degrees of actual influ-
ence.292  Other bodies’ formal authority exists within the statutorily
prescribed lawmaking process, such as the scientific committees just
described.293  The Clean Air Act,294 Taylor Grazing Act,295 and the
289 The Health Effects Institute, in Boston, Massachusetts, is jointly funded by the EPA
and the automobile industry and is widely credited with providing important, objective,
and impartial scientific expertise to regulators. See MCGARITY & WAGNER, supra note 286, at R
262–65 (contrasting the Health Effects Institute with other scientific bodies in advisory
positions); JASANOFF, supra note 281, at 208–26 (discussing the success of the Health Effects R
Institute as a model for science policy reform).
290 Although not focused on the particular challenges of climate science, Professor
Holly Doremus has recently published an excellent article that proposes ways to structure
agency decision making to promote greater scientific integrity in environmental poli-
cymaking. See Doremus, supra note 285, at 1640–52. R
291 See id. at 1643–44 (advocating for neutral expert advice to enhance integrity in
environmental policymaking).
292 See Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. App. 1 (2006).
293 See supra notes 281–91 and accompanying text. R
294 Under the Clean Air Act, there are “interstate transport commissions” made up of
representatives of state governments and the EPA with authority to make recommenda-
tions for strategies to address interstate air pollution.  42 U.S.C. § 7506a–c (2006).
295 Under the Taylor Grazing Act, as supplemented by the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act, resource advisory councils consisting of members “representative of the
various major citizens’ interests concerning the problems relating to land use planning or
the management of the public lands” are provided certain formal advisory responsibilities.
43 U.S.C. § 1739(a) (2006).  These responsibilities are also provided to “grazing advisory
boards” that concern the development of allotment management plans and the distribu-
tion of rangeland-betterment funds. Id. § 1753.
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Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act296 all
provide instances when Congress sought to provide stakeholders
outside the federal government with significant authority in the imple-
mentation of a federal statute.  The results, especially with the
Magnuson-Stevens Act, have been mixed, resulting in encumbered
lawmaking that has been inefficient and slow in making
recommendations.297
As applied to climate change legislation, however, this kind of
design feature would need to be structured completely differently and
could be far more effective in promoting its objective.  In these prior
statutory schemes, Congress provided additional political leverage to
already-powerful interests, such as the large commercial fishing inter-
ests, which no doubt helped secure the legislation’s initial passage.298
The concern for climate change legislation, however, should be just
the opposite (as perhaps it should have been for the Magnuson-Ste-
vens Act): not that long-term interests will trump short-term, but that
296 Pursuant to the Magnuson-Stevens Act, eight regional fishery management coun-
cils play a critical role in the Act’s administration. See 16 U.S.C. § 1852 (2006).  These
councils have the primary responsibility for both proposing and then initially allocating
individual tradable rights in most fisheries, known as individual tradable quotas. See id.
§ 1854(c)(3).  Their recommendations become law upon review and approval by the Sec-
retary of Commerce. Id. § 1854(a).  There are a specified number of voting and non-
voting members for each council and the statute sets forth in some detail the general
qualifications. See id. §§ 1854(a), (b).  In addition to the Regional Director of the National
Marine Fisheries Service for the relevant geographic area, id. § 1852(b)(1)(B), the Secre-
tary appoints to the council  “individuals who, by reason of their occupational or other
experience, scientific expertise, or training, are knowledgeable regarding the conservation
and management, or the commercial or recreational harvest, of the fishery resources of
the geographical area concerned.” Id. § 1852(b)(2)(A).  The Secretary of Commerce is
further required to ensure, “to the extent practicable, . . . a fair and balanced apportion-
ment . . . of the active participants (or their representatives) in the commercial and recrea-
tional fisheries under the jurisdiction of the Council.” Id. § 1852(b)(2)(B).
297 The regional councils of the Magnuson-Stevens Act were designed to promote the
fishing industry’s acceptance of what was expected to be a controversial regulatory scheme,
especially transferable fishing rights, by promising commercial interests a powerful seat at
the lawmaking table.  Industry would not be limited to commenting on proposed rules but
rather was provided a formal role in the crafting of the substance of those rules in the first
place.  In practice, however, it proved very hard for the different commercial interests to
forge agreements in what was often a zero-sum game of allocating fishing rights.  One
reason that the councils have not been even slower than they are in reaching agreement is
that they are dominated by the larger, more economically powerful sectors of the fishing
industry.  Katrina Miriam Wyman, From Fur to Fish: Reconsidering the Evolution of Private Prop-
erty, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 117, 177–81 (2005).  The particular structure created by the
Magnuson-Stevens Act also invites a series of potential vetoes that in practice make further
lawmaking obstacles.  The Secretary of Commerce retains formal power of approval, dis-
gruntled interests can seek judicial review of approved measures, and, most significantly to
date, special interest groups can prompt individual senators to block regional council rec-
ommendations by appropriations riders and other narrowly focused legislative enactments.
Id. at 181–85.  In the 1990s, a handful of senators successfully imposed a four-year morato-
rium on transferable quota programs approved by both the Secretary’s National Marine
Fisheries Service and regional councils. Id. at 184–88.
298 Wyman, supra note 297, at 184–88; see, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1852. R
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long-term interests will get bargained away over time by a steady bar-
rage of short-term pressures.
For this same reason, the kind of stakeholders that would warrant
a heightened role in the lawmaking process for climate change would
be those who give voice to long-term interests of future generations299
and not representatives of industry who do not otherwise lack influ-
ence in lawmaking fora.300  These voices could, as described above, be
given a formal office within the government.301  Or they could instead
be included as nongovernmental employees on councils more like
those contemplated by the Magnuson-Stevens Act,302 albeit with a
quite different policy focus.303
Finally, the role of such stakeholder councils in the implementa-
tion of climate change law could also be substantially modified.  In the
Magnuson-Stevens Act, their role is to initiate the lawmaking process
by making recommendations on certain policies.304  That is, of course,
not the only possible role of a stakeholder council.  A council might
be alternatively designed to ensure that statutory implementation stays
on track, that is, to provide the oversight necessary to make sure it is
not derailed.  A council could also be designed to ensure that if new
scientific information surfaces indicating that even tougher measures
are required, the statute’s implementation would be modified
accordingly.
Of course, this is similar to the kind of role that an internal (to
the government) or external committee of scientists might serve.  The
only difference is the precise makeup of the council or committee.
Given the nature of some of the decisions to be made, however, there
is reason to believe that a science-driven group may lack the necessary
breadth of perspective that other stakeholder leaders might supply,305
299 Jacobs, supra note 94, at 218–19 (commenting on how organized interest groups R
can “represent one of the few mechanisms forcing governments to take long-run outcomes
seriously”).
300 See Noah D. Hall, Toward a New Horizontal Federalism: Interstate Water Management in
the Great Lakes Region, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 405, 455 (2006) (noting that representatives of
industry have a sphere of influence in Congress).
301 See supra notes 276–80 and accompanying text.
302 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801–84.
303 Heads of philanthropic foundations, nonprofit organizations, university presidents,
or former governmental leaders could, by dint of their professional outlook and past expe-
rience, be anticipated to have the essential broader, longer-term focus and perspective.
These, of course, are the kind of seasoned veterans, no longer preoccupied by personal
ambition, on whose judgment the nation frequently relies in times of crisis.  The 9/11
Commission and the Iraq Study Group are two obvious recent examples, although their
ultimate work product was limited to reports that included recommendations. See 9/11
COMMISSION REPORT, at xv-xviii (2004); IRAQ STUDY GROUP REPORT 6–8 (2006).
304 See 16 U.S.C. § 1852(h).
305 See Sheila Jasanoff, Transparency in Public Science: Purposes, Reasons, Limits, 68 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., 21, 43 (2006) (noting that “both lay and professional viewpoints” might
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which is why a stakeholder council is a further design feature worthy
of consideration.
3. Maintaining and, if Necessary, Accelerating the Executive
Branch’s Implementation of Climate Change Legislation
A third category of design features anticipates the many road-
blocks that will occur during the process of statutory implementation
within the Executive Branch, especially over the long term.  These fea-
tures deliberately build into the original statutory scheme mechanisms
that directly limit the effectiveness of the roadblock.  These features
accomplish that end sometimes by creating lawmaking shortcuts that
circumvent the roadblock and other times simply by eliminating the
roadblock altogether.  The statutory objective is to prevent the Execu-
tive Branch, either intentionally or negligently, from frustrating con-
gressional objectives by delaying the law’s implementation.
a.  For instance, Congress can create a lawmaking shortcut that
allows lawmaking to be made in the absence of Executive Branch action within
a specified time period. This can occur if Congress would actually prefer
Executive Branch lawmaking but anticipates that roadblocks may pre-
vent the agency from acting in a sufficiently expeditious manner.
Both to encourage the agency to act, and to ensure that law is made
without undue delay, Congress can create a lawmaking scheme that is
triggered by default in the event that the agency fails to act by the
statutorily specified deadline.  Moreover, an especially demanding
congressional scheme that is triggered by default provides powerful
economic interests that might normally have been seeking to delay
agency lawmaking efforts with every incentive to ensure that the
agency meets its deadline.
Congress embraced such a design feature in the Hazardous and
Solid Waste Act Amendments of 1984,306 which amended the Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).307  Under section
3004 of RCRA, Congress required the EPA to promulgate pretreat-
ment standards for a series of categories of hazardous wastes prior to
their disposal on land.308  But Congress was also aware that the EPA
had violated similar deadlines in environmental statutes in the past,
sometimes because of agency intransigence but just as likely because
of regulated industry lawsuits.309  The result was years of regulatory
be needed to ensure the breadth of perspective that would represent the interests of citi-
zens in government decisions).
306 Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221.
307 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992 (2006).
308 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act § 3004 (codified in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.).
309 See Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of Federal Environ-
mental Law, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311, 323–25 (1991).
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delay and an undesirable vacuum of environmental protection
standards.310
To avoid that happening again, in 1984, Congress added what
have been euphemistically referred to as “soft” and “hard” “hammers”
that call for automatic imposition of extraordinarily harsh pretreat-
ment standards in the event that the EPA misses the statutorily pre-
scribed deadlines for promulgation of pretreatment standards.311
The soft hammer, triggered by a miss of an initial deadline, is a very
tough standard set forth by the statute.  The hard hammer, triggered
by missing a final deadline, is an absolute prohibition of the disposal
of the waste in question on land.312
Congress’ establishment of a default standard completely
changed the lawmaking dynamic.  Not only did the EPA have an over-
riding incentive to meet the deadlines, but regulated industry also had
an incentive to ensure the agency’s compliance.  Industry could not,
accordingly, risk legal challenges or other action that might prompt
the agency to miss the deadlines.  Not surprisingly, the EPA met essen-
tially all of the applicable deadlines.313
Drafters of climate change legislation might well want to consider
including comparable lawmaking shortcuts that precommit to certain
climate change emissions reduction requirements in the absence of
the necessary subsequent action taken by the Executive Branch
agency charged with the law’s implementation.  The potential is con-
siderable that those resisting imposition of climate change emissions
reduction requirements will seek to delay their implementation.  But
by anticipating that potential and precommiting to certain legal stan-
dards in the event of delays greater than a specified time period, cli-
mate change legislation can effectively both reduce the incentive for
such obstructionist efforts and ensure that a lengthy legal vacuum
does not result.
b.  Congress could also create a lawmaking shortcut by separating
the policy question of what standard should apply in a particular fac-
tual circumstance from the distinct factual inquiry of whether that cir-
310 See id. at 355–56.
311 42 U.S.C. § 6904; see Julie M. Kane, The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA), in BASICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 295, 316–17 (PLI Real Estate Law & Practice
Course Handbook Series No. 373, 1991); James J. Florio, Congress as Reluctant Regulator:
Hazardous Waste Policy in the 1980’s, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 351, 351 (1986) (noting that Congress
“established self-enforcing standards to be implemented in the absence of agency action”);
Michael P. Vandenbergh, An Alternative to Ready, Fire, Aim: A New Framework to Link Environ-
mental Targets in Environmental Law, 85 KY. L.J. 803, 839 (1997).
312 42 U.S.C. § 6924(d)–(e), (g); see Kane, supra note 311, at 316–17; Arlene Elgart R
Mirsky et al., The Interface Between Bankruptcy and Environmental Laws, 46 BUS. LAW. 623,
678–79 (1991) (discussing the restrictions on land disposal under the Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act).
313 LAZARUS, supra note 2, at 194. R
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cumstance is actually present.  A statutorily prescribed standard triggered by
a subsequent agency finding allows Congress to dictate what the regula-
tory requirements or other regulatory measures must be to address
different degrees of environmental hazards but then leave to another
entity the responsibility (and potential political heat) of making the
finding that triggers the standard.  Congress, in effect, precommits to
a series of lawmaking standards that someone else then triggers.
The nonattainment provisions of the Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1990 illustrate this possibility.314  Here again, Congress sought to
take away the EPA’s discretion to decide what regulatory measures
were necessary to address varying degrees of nonattainment of na-
tional ambient air quality standards.  Accordingly, Congress set forth
in exhaustive detail programs that became increasingly prescriptive
for sources of air pollution as an area of the country went from just
barely out of compliance to extremely out of compliance.315  The spe-
cific statutory designations were “Marginal,” “Moderate,” “Serious,”
“Severe,” and “Extreme” nonattainment.316  Congress therefore was
not itself responsible for deciding which parts of the country war-
ranted which designation, which allowed it to avoid political pressures
that otherwise might have made it more difficult to prescribe stringent
requirements.  Under the Act, the EPA was responsible for designat-
ing whether an area in nonattainment was marginal, moderate, seri-
ous, severe, or extreme.317
Climate change legislation could also utilize this kind of precom-
mitment device.  Congress could precommit to increasingly stringent
standards depending, for instance, on the degree of greenhouse gas
emissions reductions deemed necessary.  This precommitment would
allow Congress to make the critical policy determination regarding
which kinds and combinations of regulatory measures and economic
incentives would be best to achieve different levels of emissions reduc-
tion.  But at the same time, Congress could leave to a more detached,
politically insulated body the decision regarding how serious the cli-
mate change problem truly was, how much temperature could rise,
and therefore how much reduction of emissions was in fact necessary.
Such a scheme has the added benefit of simultaneously allowing for
steadfastness in the overall policy objective, for an established legisla-
tive decision regarding the distribution of compliance costs, and for
flexibility for change in applicable legal requirements in response to
the latest scientific information about climate change.
314 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7501–15.
315 See id. §§ 7511–7512.
316 Id.
317 Id. § 7407(d).
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In addition, although Congress delegated the determination of
the relative seriousness of the problem to the EPA in the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990, Congress might decide to delegate the relevant
fact-finding trigger in climate change legislation to a more politically
autonomous body.  As described above, such a decision-making body
could take any of a variety of forms, including a committee of govern-
mental or nongovernmental scientists or a specially crafted commis-
sion or committee dominated by individuals appointed based on their
ability to maintain the necessary longer-term perspective.318  Congress
could make such a more politically autonomous body responsible for
any of a host of findings—(1) current greenhouse gas emissions; (2)
current atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gas emissions; (3)
current forecasts of temperature increases; (4) current percentage
emissions reductions necessary to achieve prescribed goal of atmos-
pheric concentrations or temperature change; or (5) the presence or
absence of comparable greenhouse gas reduction efforts by other de-
veloped or developing nations—that could in turn trigger a wave of
statutory requirements, or even relax them.
c.  A statutory provision for non-, limited-, or conditional federal pre-
emption of state climate change law could be another effective tech-
nique for ensuring that federal climate change legislation stays on
track over the long term.  The extent to which federal law preempts
state climate change law is likely to be one of the most significant pol-
icy disputes in the drafting of the federal legislation during the next
four years.319  Industry’s desire for federal preemption of state climate
law is one of the reasons why many in the industry affirmatively want
federal legislation: to eliminate the potential burden of having to
comply with multiple and varying state law requirements.320  Both the
states and many environmentalists, however, believe no less strongly
that state police power authority to address climate change should not
be preempted, especially in light of what they perceive as decades of
foot-dragging on the issue by the national government.321
318 See supra Part III.B.2.
319 See Daniel A. Farber, Climate Change, Federalism, and the Constitution, 50 ARIZ. L. REV.
879, 900–10, 921–23 (2008) (discussing preemption in the context of climate change law).
320 See William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling
Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1569–70 (2007) (discussing “industry support for fed-
eral legislation broadly preempting state and local regulation of greenhouse gases”); Eric
Lipton & Gardiner Harris, In Turnaround, Industries Seek U.S. Regulations: A Broad Tactical
Shift; Trying to Fend Off Suits, Foreign Competitors and State Efforts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2007,
at A1 (“While businesses often oppose requirements by saying they are unnecessary as it is
already in their interest to produce safe products, at other times they have asked for them
to avoid a patchwork of state regulations, to ensure that competitors must meet the same
standard or to provide legal protection.”).
321 See Lisa Heinzerling, Climate, Preemption, and the Executive Branches, 50 ARIZ. L. REV.
925, 925–29 (2008) (suggesting that “state regulation of greenhouse gases . . . would bene-
fit from equal attention to the role of state executive agencies in asserting power to regu-
\\server05\productn\C\CRN\94-5\CRN503.txt unknown Seq: 77  7-JUL-09 12:15
2009] SUPER WICKED PROBLEMS AND CLIMATE CHANGE 1229
Congress could draft a federal preemption provision that both
strikes a balance between these competing concerns and serves as a
very significant check on the federal government’s implementation of
climate change legislation.  For instance, not only could any such pro-
vision narrowly define the scope of federal preemption to leave signifi-
cant room for state law that supplements and in no manner conflicts
with federal requirements, but the federal statute could make the ulti-
mate scope of federal preemption expressly dependent on the success
of federal efforts.  Congress could use any number of benchmarks to
measure success or lack of success.  The statutory trigger required for
preemption, limited preemption, or nonpreemption could be a for-
mal finding or action by a designated federal government official,322 a
designated committee of individuals within or outside the government
with relevant expertise, or even the states themselves.  An example of
this last option could be a federal preemption provision that would be
lifted in the event of a state establishing the existence of specified
circumstances.  Alternatively, the trigger could be a statutorily speci-
fied number of states taking certain action, including the passage of
their own requirements addressing a particular issue.  Congress could
consider just the fact of action by a large number of states to be suffi-
cient evidence that there was something remiss in the federal ef-
fort.323  The lifting of federal preemption, or the mere threat of a
lifting of federal preemption, might well be enough to provide federal
officials and industry with the incentives necessary to jumpstart a
stalled federal program.
d.  Finally, lawmaking design features could even seek to remove
altogether anticipated litigation roadblocks to statutory implementa-
tion by limiting judicial review of some kinds of agency decisions and
promoting judicial review of other kinds of agency decisions.  Congress
could define these limits by focusing on types of decisions or types of
plaintiffs in determining which kinds of lawsuits threaten timely im-
late even in the face of federal resistance”); Felicity Barringer & William Yardley, Bush Splits
on Greenhouse Gases with Congress and State Officials, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2007, at A1.
322 For instance, the current Clean Air Act expressly preempts state regulation of mo-
tor vehicle emissions but makes an exception for California based upon a finding by the
state that the state standards will be “at least as protective of public health and welfare” as
applicable federal standards.  42 U.S.C. § 7543(b).  Thus, EPA must grant California a pre-
emption waiver unless the EPA Administrator affirmatively finds that the State’s determina-
tion is “arbitrary and capricious,” not justified by “compelling and extraordinary
circumstances,” or “ not consistent” with the federal standards. Id. § 7543(b).  The Clean
Air Act also allows other states to adopt the California standards if they are in noncompli-
ance with relevant national air quality standards. Id. § 7507.
323 See Howard A. Learner, Restraining Federal Preemption When There Is an “Emerging Con-
sensus” of State Environmental Laws and Policies, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 649, 651 (2008) (arguing
that “an emerging state consensus” should “influence a reviewing court’s application of
federal preemption principles”).
\\server05\productn\C\CRN\94-5\CRN503.txt unknown Seq: 78  7-JUL-09 12:15
1230 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:1153
plementation and which kinds of lawsuits are, by contrast, necessary to
spur timely implementation.
Statutory analogues exist in other contexts.  For instance, the
Anti-Injunction Act forbids a federal court from issuing an injunction
to stay state court proceedings in the absence of express congressional
authority.324  The Tax Anti-Injunction Act limits the authority of
courts to enjoin the imposition of federal taxes.325  In the Norris-La-
Guardia Act of 1932,326 Congress sought to limit the authority of fed-
eral courts to enjoin labor strikes.  More recently, in the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liabil-
ity Act, Congress limited judicial review of administrative agency or-
ders and remedies to clean up hazardous waste sites in order to
prevent lawsuits from slowing the cleanup process.327  There may well
be aspects of the implementation of climate change legislation that
are at least as urgent and for which Congress may want to ensure im-
plementation is not delayed as a result of lawsuits brought by certain
kinds of aggrieved plaintiffs.  Any such limitation on judicial review,
however, should be considered a fairly drastic lawmaking restraint and
embraced at all only in narrowly tailored and bounded circumstances.
As a practical matter, moreover, any broad effort to limit judicial re-
view is likely to be politically unpalatable, as witnessed during the
Bush Administration’s recent effort to include such a provision in fed-
eral bailout legislation.328
Conversely, Congress may decide that judicial review is precisely
what is necessary to eliminate statutory roadblocks, including agency
enforcement, that Congress anticipates will arise within the Executive
Branch.  To that end, Congress can authorize certain kinds of plain-
tiffs with certain kinds of claims to bring citizen suits seeking a court
order that the agency comply with statutory mandates or judicial relief
against a source of greenhouse gas emissions in violation of federal
requirements.  Of course, such citizen-suit provisions are already one
of modern environmental law’s hallmark achievements.  Congress has
included citizen suit provisions in almost every modern pollution con-
trol statute in anticipation of federal agency recalcitrance to imple-
ment or fully enforce pollution control requirements in the face of
powerful political and economic resistance.  The resulting citizen law-
324 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2006).
325 See 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (2006).
326 Ch. 90, § 1, 47 Stat. 70 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101–115 (2006)).
327 See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h).
328 See Andrew Ross Sorkin, A Bailout Above the Law, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2008, at C1
(quoting the proposed bill as saying, “Decisions by the Secretary pursuant to the authority
of this Act are non-reviewable and committed to agency discretion, and may not be re-
viewed by any court of law or any administrative agency.”).
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suits have filled what would otherwise have been a significant gap in
compliance.329
Citizen-suit provisions will likely need to play a similarly impor-
tant function in climate change legislation to guard against antici-
pated Executive Branch hesitance.330  Because, however, of the
tremendous ecological complexity and scientific uncertainty sur-
rounding the sheer mechanics of climate change harm, plaintiffs al-
leging climate change harm will sometimes be hard pressed to
establish the kind of “imminent, concrete injury,” “causal nexus,” and
“redressability” required for Article III standing.  But the Supreme
Court has suggested that Congress can help plaintiffs overcome those
standing hurdles by providing citizen-suit provisions specifically aimed
at authorizing such lawsuits.  In particular, the Court has ruled that
Congress can create injuries, define causal chains, and provide for le-
gal redress in a manner that allows for a lawsuit that would otherwise
fall short of Article III.331  Congress could therefore include in federal
climate legislation language designed to allow citizen suits by those
seeking to vindicate the interests of future generations in avoiding cat-
astrophic climate change.
CONCLUSION
Lawmaking moments do not happen very often, at least for envi-
ronmental law.  The last major environmental lawmaking moment was
almost twenty years ago, when Congress passed the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990332 after a thirteen-year legislative logjam arising
out of the distributional battles surrounding acid rain.  Soon, how-
ever, the nation is likely to have an exceedingly important lawmaking
moment with the passage of long-overdue domestic climate change
329 See LAZARUS, supra note 2, at 190–91. R
330 The climate change context no doubt creates heightened concerns about citizen-
suit plaintiff Article III standing in light of the often enormous spatial and temporal
dimensions of climate change cause and effect.  The Supreme Court has already estab-
lished, however, that Article III standing requirements do not preclude a citizen suit based
on climate change. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 526 (2007).  Moreover, there
are other innovative ways for Congress to create, in effect, a category of plaintiffs with the
requisite interest for Article III standing. See Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan?
Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 229–35 (1992) (suggesting
ways that Congress may “alter [the] outcomes” in “cases in which the Court has previously
rejected standing”).
331 549 U.S. at 516 (“‘Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains
of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before.’”) (quot-
ing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment)); Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 128 S.Ct. 1142,
1153 (2009) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“This case would present different considerations
if Congress had sught to provide redress for a concrete injury ‘giv[ing] rise to a case or
controversy  where none existed before.’”) (quoting same).
332 Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399.
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legislation.  All the political ingredients seem well in place for that
moment sometime during the next four years.
The ultimate success of that legislation, however, depends on ad-
vance recognition by Congress that lawmaking moments are only
that—“moments.”  Congress should, accordingly, include within cli-
mate change legislation institutional design features, such as precom-
mitment strategies, that deliberately make it hard for powerful, short-
term political and economic pressures to undo that legislation.  Insti-
tutional design of lawmaking processes always matters, but it matters
most if, as is true for climate change law, long-term implementation is
essential to the law’s success.
In application to climate change legislation, moreover, any per se
objection to precommitment strategies based on concerns about their
antidemocratic effects should go unheeded.  Such precommitment
strategies are a well-established design feature of our lawmaking
processes, embraced both by the Framers of our Constitution and by
prior Congresses.  They are embedded in the traditions of our form of
government and in no manner represent an anathema.  If, as here,
the impact on future generations of present generations’ failing to
address climate change is so potentially devastating, the greater threat
to future generations by far would be the failure of present genera-
tions to restrict lawmaking to safeguard the future.
The challenge to develop the right mix of precommitment strate-
gies is considerable and the risk of any particular law being perversely
hijacked can never be eliminated.  But through the kind of asymmet-
ric hurdles and shortcuts that I have described, Congress could dimin-
ish the risk of short-term pressures undermining whatever legislation
it passes and increase the chance that the concerns of future genera-
tions would be not be forgotten during the decades required for the
new law’s ambitious objective to be achieved.  That would be truly
momentous.333
333 As of the time of this Article’s going to press (early 2009), none of the major cli-
mate change bills pending before Congress included any significant or systematic efforts to
enlist precommitment strategies in the form of either hurdles or shortcuts in anticipation
of problems likely to plague the law’s subsequent implementation.  During the 110th Con-
gress, Senate Bill 2191 contemplated the creation of several new governmental entities
(Carbon Market Efficiency Board, Climate Change Credit Corporation, and Climate
Change Technology Board) and sets for terms of office (up to fourteen years), qualifica-
tions (including representation of both business and consumer interests), and bipartisan-
ship, and provides for a science advisor for the Carbon Market Efficiency Board. See S.
2191, 110th Cong. tits. II, IV (2007).  A draft discussion bill promoted by Representative
John Dingell during the 110th Congress similarly contemplated creation of new govern-
mental entities (International Climate Change Commission, Office of Carbon Market
Oversight, National Climate Change Adaptation Council), lengthy terms for some posi-
tions (up to twelve years), and bipartisanship requirements. See Dingell-Boucher Discus-
sion Draft, supra note 246, §§ 403, 602, 784.  The most sweeping, recent legislative R
initiative, is the discussion draft bill informally circulated by Representatives Henry Wax-
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man and Edward Markey on March 31, 2009, entitled the “American Clean Energy and
Security Act of 2009.” See H.R. __, 111th Cong. (2009) (discussion draft), http://
energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20090331/acesa_discussiondraft. pdf.  This latest
discussion draft does include some promising examples of precommitment strategies, in-
cluding (1) the creation of an advisory council the members of which have longer terms,
required scientific expertise, and assigned lawmaking authorities, id. §§ 731–33 (describ-
ing the “Offsets Integrity Board”); (2) inclusion on a corporation board established by the
Act of a representative from nonprofit environmental organizations, id. § 114(b) (describ-
ing  membership on a “Carbon Storage Research Corporation); (3) legislative declaration
of specific numerical standards to be established for percentage electricity savings, id.
§ 611(d)(1)(B), greenhouse-gas reduction in emissions, id. at 327–28, and total annual
emission allowances, id. § 721(e); (4) provisions for persons to petition the EPA Adminis-
trator to undertake certain regulatory action coupled with requirements that the Adminis-
trator must act within specified deadlines, e.g., id. § 711(c)(6); and (5) potentially
expansive citizen suit provisions plainly designed to overcome Article III standing hurdles
suggested by recent Supreme Court precedent, by defining “harm” to include “risk” of
injury, “incremental exacerbation” of risk of injury, “widely shared” risk, harm causd by
agency action that “slows the pace of implementation of this Act,” and the possibility of
compensation for the citizen plaintiff in the form of “beneficial mitigation projects.” Id.
§§ 336, 862.  These are all promising isolated initiatives, but all of these bills currently
under discussion  still fall far short of anticipating and addressing the need for the kind of
systematic precommitment strategies, discussed in this Article, to avoid the law’s derail-
ment and to increase the odds of its achieving its long-term goals.
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